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AIRLINE LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
HERBERT

R.

NORTHRUP*

L ABOR PROTECTIVE provisions (LPPs), as utilized in
-the
railroad and airline industries, generally provide
that employees whosejobs are lost, downgraded, or transferred as a result of merger, acquisition, or transfer of significant assets are entitled to compensation for as long as
five years. Other provisions relate to seniority, relocation
of place of work, etc. LPPs have been utilized in railroad
mergers and related situations as a result of either government orders or labor agreements for more than fifty
years and in analogous airline controversies since at least
1950.
The railroad industry has experienced declining employment since 1920 except for a sharp upsurge during
World War II. The airline industry, to the contrary, has
seen its employee count rise almost continually since
shortly before World War II through 1980, except for cyclical declines, then decrease into 1983 before overcoming
the loss by early 1986. Both railroads and airlines were
restrictively regulated prior to the late 1970s. Now railroads are somewhat deregulated and airlines are substantially deregulated, except in matters concerning safety.
Throughout this period, Congress has not sought to
impose LPPs on industry generally. Instead, Congress
* Herbert R. Northrup, Professor of Industry and Director, Industrial Research
Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.D. 1942, Harvard University. Lynda Filson provided material assistance in the construction of cost estimates and Frank Bennett made several helpful comments.

401

402

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

has deemed it wise to allow management, and, where
present, unions to prescribe the conditions under which
layoffs occasioned by mergers, company takeovers, or indeed any adverse impact upon employment will occur and
be mitigated. In the regulated railroad and airline industries, however, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), acting on
broad grants of power from Congress, regularly and almost automatically imposed LPPs as a price for approving
mergers, acquisitions, and certain other business transactions.I In 1979, after the advent of deregulation, the CAB
particularly altered its policy, determining that LPPs
would be mandated in the future only "where necessary
to prevent labor strife that would disrupt the nation's air
transportation system."' 2 The Board did order LPPs in at
least four subsequent merger cases, however, reasoning
that unions had not had sufficient time to respond to the
changed circumstances. 3 The Department of TransportaI An excellent history of the use of LPPs in the railroad and airline industries
prior to deregulation is found in S. B. ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS
INAIRLINE MERGERS (1981). Prior to deregulation, the CAB did not impose LPPs
in a few cases where the cost was so high as to negate benefits or where losses to
employees were slight or temporary. See American - Pan Am Route Exchange,
Employee Conditions, 74 C.A.B. 977, 979 (1977) (LPPs not imposed because
CAB found no systemwide impact on employees as a result of route swap); Frontier Airlines, Temporary Suspension of Service, 58 C.A.B. 864, 869-70 (1972)
(LPPs not imposed on Frontier because the imposition of LPP would reduce the
financial benefits to Frontier from the suspension); Slick Airways, Suspension of
Service, 26 C.A.B. 779 (1958) (LPP not imposed because the purpose of the suspension was to reduce Slick's losses and give it a reasonable opportunity to resume service, and LPP would reduce the effectiveness of this strategy).
" See Braniff South American Route-Transfer Case, 102 C.A.B. 103, 127 (1983)
(the CAB limited LPPs to circumstances where they were necessary to mitigate
labor strife that would adversely affect air transportation as a whole); Dallas/Ft.
Worth -London Case, 100 C.A.B. 182, 196 (1983) (LPPs not imposed because
possibility of service disruption as a result of labor strife was unlikely); National
Airlines, Acquisition, 84 C.A.B. 408, 475 (1979) (CAB imposed LPPs because a
sudden change in policy would be unfair to labor organizations, but stated that in
the future LPPs would only be imposed when required by special circumstances);
see also Green, Labor Protective Provisions in the Airline Industry, 1950-1985, in ALIABA Course of Study Materials: Airline Labor and Employment Law 6933 at 285-87
(1985).
" See Western Air Lines, Control by AFSI, 93 C.A.B. 545, 568 (1982)(LPPs imposed because CAB recognized that it was equitable to provide some period dur-
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tion (DOT), which took over some functions of the now
defunct CAB,4 has affirmed that it will not impose LPPs
except in the most extraordinary situations,5 and it has
not done so to date.6 The courts have endorsed the7
DOT's policy as consistent with congressional policy.
The conference report accompanying the Airline Dereguing which labor and management may negotiate merger protections); Seaboard
Acquisition by Tiger Int'l, 86 C.A.B. 29, 117 (1980) (LPPs imposed because labor
parties were not on notice of the CAB's new policy in time to bargain for their
own merger protection); Airwest, Acquisition by Republic Airlines, 86 C.A.B.
1971, 1976 (1980) (LPPs imposed because of insufficient time for labor and management to negotiate new terms in light of CAB's new LPP policy); National Airlines, 84 C.A.B. at 474 (imposed LPPs because labor had not had fair notice of a
change in policy); see also TXI - Continental Acquisition, Labor Provisions, 89
C.A.B. 223 (1981) (Texas International, the acquiring company, voluntarily accepted the standard LPPs).
In the following cases, all decided after deregulation, the CAB declined to impose LPPs as a condition of merger: Transamerica Airlines Acquisition of Cent.
Am. Int'l, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 84-7-60 (July 19, 1984); C.A.B. Order No. 8410-5 (Oct. 12, 1984); C.A.B. Order No. 84-12-126 (Dec. 28, 1984); Braniff-Pacific
Southwest, Agreement Exemption, 100 C.A.B. 720, 726 (1983) (LPPs not imposed because the imposition of LPPs could actually increase the risk of labor
strife); Great N. Pilots, Petition, 86 C.A.B. 2226, 2229 (1980)(LPPs not imposed
because parties did not allege special circumstances sufficient to justify intervention); Capital Control by Batchelor, ALPA Petition, 86 C.A.B. 2122, 2124 (1980)
(LPPs not imposed; CAB stated that LPPs are extraordinary measures used only
when problems threaten the stability of systemwide operations).
4 Congress terminated the CAB and transferred its functions to the Department
of Transportation effective December 31, 1981. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982).
%See Midway - Air Florida Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, D.O.T. Order
No. 85-6-33 at 6 (June 11, 1985) for a concise statement of DOT policy that has
since been reiterated in several cases.
a The DOT has declined to order the imposition of LPPs in the following cases:
American Airlines, Inc. and ACI Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-3-80 (Mar.
30, 1987) (American's takeover of Air California); NWA-Republic Acquisition
Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-7-81 (July 31, 1986) (Northwest acquired Republic);
Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-2 (Oct. 1, 1986)
(Texas Air acquired control of Eastern); Texas Air Corp. and People Express,
Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-53 (Oct. 24, 1986) (Texas Air's takeover of People
Express); Pacific Div. Transfer Case, D.O.T. Order No. 85-12-1 (Dec. 2, 1985)
(United's purchase of Pan American's Pacific routes).
7 See Braniff Master Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB,
693 F.2d 220, 227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (a general instruction to consider wages
and working conditions cannot be read as a congressional command to the CAB
to impose LPPs routinely); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 643 F.2d 935, 940
(2d Cir. 1981) (the Airline Deregulation Act does not require the CAB to consider
the labor implications of a carrier's proposal).
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lation Act of 1978 states that congressional policy
provides:
The 'public interest' standard in section 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is retained in the new section,
but that standard must now be interpreted in light of the
intent of Congress to move the airline industry rapidly toward deregulation. The foundation of the new airline legislation is that it is in the public interest to allow the airline
industry to be governed by the forces of the marketplace. 8
Meanwhile, in the railroad industry, the Reagan administration successfully opposed including a LPP in the 1986
legislation providing for the sale of Conrail to the public. 9
Furthermore, the ICC has declined to impose LPPs in
sales of trackage by a major rail carrier to small carriers
(short lines) which, because of low overhead and highly
productive, nonunion labor, can use such trackage profitably. 10 To alter these policies, both the airline and the
railroad unions" have sought for several years to make
LPPs mandatory in most major business intercarrier
transactions. Congress failed to include bills to this effect
in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.12 In 1982 Congress again refused to enact such bills for the airline in* H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978).
* Agreement Reportedly Reached on Scrapping Labor Protectionfrom Conrail Sale Measure, 195 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-10- 11 (Oct. 8, 1986)[hereinafter Agreement].
- Machalaba, Many New RailroadsAre in Businessfor the Short Haul, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 24, 1986, at 5, col. 1. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94
Star. 1895 (1980), decreased economic regulation in the railroad industry. 49
U.S.C. § 10505(g)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1987) provides, however, that the ICC may
not "relieve a carrier of its obligation to protect the interests of employees" with
respect to matters generally coming within the framework of LPPs. See McDonald,
Airline Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 869
(1987).
"1 Two of the largest of these unions, the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline
Clerks and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
represent a major group of employees in both industries.
A different protective measure was included in the deregulation law providing for prior employment rights to employees laid off as a result of merger and for
financial assistance to displaced workers. Litigation concerning these provisions
was finally concluded in 1987, but the measure remains dormant as described infra
text accompanying notes 32-37.
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dustry.13 Then, in the 2nd session of the 99th Congress,
two bills passed the House of Representatives. The first
bill, H.R. 4838, would have mandated LPP coverage for
all airline mergers, acquisitions, or transfers of significant
assets. The second bill, H.R. 5300, would have provided
that after the sale of Conrail to the public, any employees
adversely affected by the sale or abandonment of rail lines
would be covered by a LPP. The Senate rejected both
provisions and also voted down attempts to include such
legislation in the continuing budget resolution.14 Interestingly, pilots from Trans World Airlines (TWA), People
Express, and Frontier Airlines opposed H.R. 4838 during
the Senate's consideration of the bill "either because it
could have imperiled merger or wiped out their seniority
preferences."' 5
Despite such cracks in their solidarity, the airline and
railroad unions again have sponsored LPP legislation.
H.R. 3332, the railroad proposal, would extend LPPs not
only to the sales and abandonments which might result
now that Conrail has been sold to the public, but also to
all railroad sales and abandonments, including those to
short lines, which the ICC now exempts from instituting
LPPs. Both H.R. 1101,16 which the House of Representa-

tives passed by a voice vote on June 22, 1987, and S. 943,
which is almost identical to H.R. 1101, pertain to airlines
and contain the exact language as did H.R. 4838. H.R.
1101 was also included as part of H.R. 3035, which passed
both the House and the Senate in October 1987. H.R.
3332 was included in the Senate version as well (see Appendix A).
This study first examines the nature of LPPs, and then
1. Senate Reects Airline Employee ProtectionMeasure, 157 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at
A-8-10 (Aug. 13, 1982).
s4 Senate Refuses to Enact Measure to Protect Seniority in Air Mergers, 191 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at A-10-1 1 (Oct. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Senate Refuses]; see Stuart, Accord
Near on Conrail Sale, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at D4, col. 2; Agreement, supra note 9
and accompanying text.
, See Senate Refuses, supra note 14, at A-i 1.
i" See infra Appendix A for a reproduction of H.R. 1101 and notes thereon.
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traces their background, development, and application to
the airline industry. The main part of the study then follows, in which the costs of LPPs to the airline industry are
estimated under various realistic scenarios, and the benefits of LPPs to different classes of labor are examined.
The final section deals with pertinent economic considerations, particularly the potential impact of the costs of
LPPs upon carrier policies and employment.
I. THE NATURE OF LPPs
A fruitful way to understand the nature of LPPs is to
examine H.R. 1101, which, as noted, is almost identical to
S. 943. H.R. 1101 is a very short bill, since its effective
provisions are largely implemented by reference to other
laws, rulings, and actions. It would amend section 408 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 195817 by requiring that:
In any case which the Secretary [of Transportation] determines that the transaction which is the subject of the application would tend to cause reduction in employment, or to
adversely affect the wages and working conditions including the seniority of any air carrier employees, labor protective provisions calculated to mitigate such adverse
consequences, including procedures culminating in binding arbitration, if necessary, shall be imposed by the Secretary as a condition of approval, unless the Secretary
finds that the projected costs of protection would exceed
the anticipated financial benefits of the transaction. The
proponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of
proving there will be no adverse employment consequences or that projected costs of protection would be
excessive.
"Transactions" covered pursuant to this paragraph, by
reference to section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act, include not only mergers and acquisitions involving two or
more airlines, but also any transaction between two airlines which involves the transfer of airplanes or other assets comprising a substantial proportion of airline
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1982).
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properties. The CAB has historically defined a "substantial proportion" as ten percent or more of a carrier's total
property value.' 8 If, however, any party outside the airline industry were to acquire an airline, H.R. 1101 would
not apply. To put the matter in a practical context, not
only would United Airlines' failed attempt in 1986 to take
over Frontier Airlines have fallen within the purview of
H.R. 1101, but also its prior purchase of twenty-five Frontier aircraft would have triggered the need for LPPs if
Congress had enacted H.R. 1101. If Frontier had sold the
aircraft to a surplus plane dealer, however, who in turn
sold them to United or to another airline, H.R. 1101
would not have reached the transaction unless it was
demonstrated to be a subterfuge to avoid the coverage of
H.R. 1101.
The 1985 battle for the control of TWA provides another illustration of the far-reaching but eclectic jurisdiction which H.R. 1101 would establish.' 9 If Texas Air had
been the successful bidder for TWA, H.R. 1101 would
have required a LPP. Since Carl Icahn, who won control
of the airline, was from outside the industry, he would
have had no such obligation in his successful takeover of
the airline under H.R. 1101.
Just as the jurisdiction of H.R. 1101 is apparent only by
reference, so, likewise, the nature and scope of the LPPs it
would require are not found in the bill. There appears to
be general agreement, however, that the bill would require provisions identical, or nearly so, to the provisions
Is The ten percent requirement necessary to bring the transaction within the
purview of section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act and its predecessor legislation
was determined in Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50, 55 (1947).
Section 408(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act refers only to a "substantial
portion" of a carrier's property as coming within regulatory purview. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378(a)(1) (1982). Thus, the ten percent criterion could be modified
administratively.
It For a discussion of the 1985 battle for TWA, see Application of TWA for the
Institution of an Investigation on its Prospective Continuing Fitness under Section 401(r) of the Federal Aviation Act in the Event Carl C. Icahn Secures Control
of TWA, D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-16 (June 10, 1985); Texas Air Corp. and Trans
World Airlines, D.O.T. Order No. 85-8-48 (Aug. 16 1985); Texas Air Corp. and
Trans World Airlines, D.O.T. Order No. 85-8-50 (Aug. 19, 1985).
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first ennunciated by the CAB following the 1947 sale to
United of Western's Denver-Los Angeles route.2 0 The
CAB continued to institute these provisions in almost
every case during the regulation era. The provisions
evolved into virtually final form, 2 ' first in the takeover of
Capital by United in 196122 and then in the Allegheny
(now USAir) merger with Mohawk Airlines in 1972.28 The
"20The CAB approved the transfer of Western's route No. 68 to United in
United-Western, Acquisition Air CartierProperty, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947). At that time the
Board declined to attach any employee protective provisions to the sale. In 1948,
the CAB ordered the proceeding be reopened to determine whether any employees of Western had been adversely affected as a consequence of the transfer of
route No. 68. United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B.
701, 702 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1952). The Board found it "clear that a portion of the employees who suffered
adverse consequences would not have suffered them if Western had not transferred the route and the equipment necessary to operate it." Id. at 706. The
Board determined that it had implied authority to impose employee protective
provisions upon the transfer. Id. at 707.
21
The Board first imposed labor protective provisions in
United-Western, Acquisition Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701
(1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1952). In that case and in the following North Atlantic Route
Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950), the Board adopted several features of the so-called Burlington Formula, developed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, with certain modifications considered
appropriate. In the Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B.
708 (1952), the Board incorporated certain features of the Washington Agreement of 1936, an agreement resulting from nationwide
collective bargaining in the railroad industry, again with modifications considered appropriate. Thus, the Board's labor protective
provisions have been selectively developed on a basis consisting of
two formulas carefully worked out in the railroad industry. In the
Delta-Chicago and Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952),
certain changes were made which have been retained in subsequent
cases. Finally, in the Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326
(1954), a revision was made to clarify the Board's intention on a certain point.
United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B 307, 323 n.71 (1961).
211 United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
In general, it will be see that we have adhered very closely to the
provisions imposed in the last five cases, in accordance with our view
that it is undesirable to make changes in the standard provisions
which have been imposed in preceding cases unless required by experience indicating need for such changes or by the particular factual circumstances of the case being decided.
id. at 323-24.
2.4 Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, 59 C.A.B.
19 (1972). "Since the 1961
United-CapitalMerger Case, the Board has consistently applied the same set of labor
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provisions apply to dismissals and displacements which
occur within three years from the effective date of the orders and include the following benefits:
1. Seniority Integration. This is to be accomplished "ina
fair and equitable manner, including, where applicable,
agreement through collective bargaining," with arbitration required if no agreement is reached.
2. Maintenanceof Pay. This provides that regardless of
the job and job pay to which the employee is assigned as a
result of the actions covered by LPPs, such affected employees may not have their compensation reduced as long
as they are unable to use seniority rights to obtain a comparable position in the same location.
(a) Employees who are placed in lower-rated jobs receive the difference in pay between their former and present jobs as a "displacement allowance."
(b) Employees entitled to such payments are termed
"displaced employees," even though they are not displaced in the ordinary sense of the term. "Displacement
allowances" are determined by dividing the last twelve
months total compensation of the employee by twelve and
paying the employee each month the amount by which
that sum exceeds the employee's current monthly salary.
If an employee works more hours in the current job than
in the previous one, the extra time compensation at the
rate of the new job is paid. Only voluntary absence can
result in reduction in compensation below the previous
job rate.
(c) Displacement allowances are triggered immediately
upon job changes which reduce compensation.
(d) Displacement allowance protection extends for a
period of four years from the date of the employee's disprotective provisions." Id. at 3 1. See Kahn, Collective Bargainingon the Airline Flight
Deck, in

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AND

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

IN AMERICAN

J. AIR L. &
COM. 334, 335 (1967); see also S. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, for a detailed study of

TRANSPORTATION 472-73 (1971); Note, CAB and LaborJurisdiction, 33

the United-Capital LPP provisions without a cost analysis.
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placement. Thus, this liability could still be in effect seven
years after the LPP was imposed.
(e) Employees with less than one year of service are not
covered by displacement benefits, but are eligible for five
days pay, at the straight-time rate per working day of the
position last occupied, for each full month in which he or
she performed such service. This amount must be paid in
a lump sum.
3. Dismissal Allowances. This provides a very elaborate,
generous, and long-lasting system of unemployment compensation for dismissed employees covered by LPPs. The
dismissed employees receive a monthly payment equivalent to sixty percent of their average monthly compensation for the previous twelve months prior to being
dismissed. This allowance is paid for a period varying
from six months to five years, depending upon the affected employee's seniority. Employees who receive this
allowance are subject to recall to service, provided the recall does not require a change in place of residence. If the
job to which the employee is recalled pays less than the
employee's previous job, the employee is eligible for the
displacement allowance. For employees who receive
other employment or unemployment compensation, the
dismissal allowance is reduced to the extent that any unemployment insurance benefits exceed the amount on
which the dismissal allowance is based.
This provision applies to all dismissals covered by LPPs
over a three-year period commencing with the effective
date of the merger. Thus, this liability could be enforced
up to eight years after the effective date of the merger.
4. Fringe Benefit Guarantees. During the "applicable period" of the LPP, i.e., the period of eligibility for allowances stated above, a covered employee may not "be
deprived of benefits attaching to his previous employment." The employee, therefore, retains the old benefits
during the displacement or dismissal period. The carrier's liability, once again, could be in effect up to eight
years later.
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5. Severance Pay. Employees eligible for a dismissal allowance may instead resign. They are then entitled to
severance or separation pay equal to three to twelve
months of their last twelve months average monthly compensation. Employees with less than one year of service
who are not eligible for a dismissal allowance receive five
days pay for each full month in which they worked, if they
were dismissed as a result of the merger. This carrier obligation lasts for three years.
6. Moving Expenses. Employees covered by LPPs who
are required to move in order to accept an assigned job
are entitled to full moving expenses for themselves and
their families. If the employee owns a home and cannot
sell it for "fair value," the carrier must either compensate
the employee for the difference between the value of the
home and its selling price or purchase the home. If the
employee is under contract to purhase a home or holds an
unexpired lease on a home, the carrier must protect the
employee from all loss. This carrier obligation lasts for
three years.
7. No Requirement to Work Out of Class. Employees cannot be deprived of any LPP benefits because they decline
to accept a position out of their craft or class.
8. Pre-Acquisition Actions and Notice. Any change in the
workforce which anticipates the action that triggers the
LPP is covered by the LPP. Carriers are required to give
forty-five days notice to employees of all proposed
changes in the employees' status.
These requirements, as set forth in various CAB orders,
are extraordinarily detailed and are not found in any legislation or administrative ruling affecting any industries
other than railroads and airlines. Both unionized companies and nonunion managements in industry generally
often institute various provisions for employees adversely
affected by mergers and acquisitions, even though LPPs
are not mandatory. Likewise, airlines often institute provisions similar to LPPs in situations in which LPPs are not
mandatory. A diligent search of literature has, however,
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uncovered no parallel to H.R. 1101 in industry generally,
in terms of either the liberality, the coverage, or the duration of the benefits. Before examining what possible costs
are involved by the imposition of LPPs as proposed by
H.R. 1101, and what would be the consequences thereof,
it is pertinent to examine briefly how and why LPPs
evolved.
II.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF

LPPs

From their inception, railroads and their labor relations
were regulated apart from industry generally. The once
overriding significance of the railroads as freight carriers,
the fact that they were clearly within the constitutional
scope of interstate commerce and therefore subject to
congressional regulation, the early rise of railroad unions
to economic and political power, and the government
takeover of the railroad system during World War I all
enhanced this approach. After World War I, efforts were
made to consolidate the railroad system. These efforts
led to an interest in job protection for railroad employees,
especially since the 1920s saw the beginning of the secular decline in employment in the railroad industry.
LPPs were first legislated with the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933, which was designed to promote consolidation and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of services. Section 7(b) of this act, however, froze
into their jobs all railroad employees actively employed in
May, 1933, who might be affected by reason of action
taken pursuant to authority contained in the Emergency
Railroad Transportation Act of 1933.... Again, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was this 'job freeze,'
no significant consolidations took place under this
legislation.24
With the 1933 emergency law scheduled to expire, un4

Rehmus, Collective Bargainingand Technological Change on American Railroads, in

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN TRANSPORTA-

TION

144 (1971).
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ions sought special LPP legislation. The carriers, hoping
to negotiate more favorable terms, found themselves
under intense pressure from the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration, so they acceded to the unions' demands
for a LPP agreement. The so-called Washington Agreement was signed on May 21, 1936, between twenty-one
railroad unions and carriers representing eighty-five percent of the nation's railroads. It covered "coordination,"
or "joint action by two or more carriers whereby they
unify, consolidate, merge, or pool" any part of their separate facilities or operation. Thereafter, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) expanded the Washington
Agreement, applying it to leases of one carrier's facilities,
abandonments, etc. The Transportation Act of 1940 affirmed the ICC's authority in this regard. 25 The Washington Agreement provisions, as interpreted and ordered by
the ICC, have served as a model for the LPPs required by
the CAB in the airline industry.
A. Application to Airlines
When the railroad industry was in deep decline, Congress adopted the policy of treating transportation employee relations differently from the employee relations of
industries in general. Congress then transferred this policy to the fledgling and growing airline industry. Thus, in
1936 Congress placed the airlines under the Railway Labor Act, even though the act's basic procedures were developed in practice in railroad labor relations, and labor
relations in airlines were still in the formative state. In
addition, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,26 section

401(1), wrote into law Decision 83 by the National Labor
Board of the National Industrial Recovery Act. This gave
airline pilots the highest minimum wage law in the nation,
25 Id. at 144-48; see R. J. ABLES, The History of and Experience under Railroad Employee Protection Plans, Studies Relating to Railroad OperatingEmployees, REPORT OF THE

PRESIDENTIAL RAILROAD COMMISSION

107-91 app. vol. III (1962) for a more de-

tailed study.
va Ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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if not in the world, and made compliance with the Railway
Labor Act a condition of being a certificated carrier.
These provisions have been continued in subsequent legislation. The CAB adopted LPPs as a condition of approving mergers, sales of assets, and other transactions
between or among airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 provided no explicit directive for such action, but
the courts agreed that it was within the inherent power of
the CAB.27
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 continued special
protection for airline employees and unions as a national
policy. 28 This legislation effectively outlawed the airlines'
Mutual Aid Pact.2 9 As a result, airlines are the only industry in which employers may not have such a pact. This
weakens management's bargaining power. Nothing in the
law proscribes similar combinations among unions, and
frequently they do form alliances.8 0
27 Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act allows the CAB to approve mergers,
acquisitions and route transfers "upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to
be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe." 49
U.S.C. § 1378 (1982). In Western Air Lines v. CAB, the court held that the CAB
may condition its approval of transactions on provisions for the protection of employees. 194 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1952). The court stated that "[a]lthough
there is no express statutory grant of power to impose conditions which will
lessen the adverse impact of a merger upon employees of the merged companies,
such power is implicit as one necessary to the performance of the [CAB's] duty to
condition approval with due regard to terms which are just and reasonable in the
interest of the public." Id. at 215; see Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (the CAB's power to impose LPPs is implicit as
one necessary to the performance of the Board's duty to condition approval with
regard to terms which are just and reasonable in the interest of public).
28 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
' 49 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(1982). A Mutual Aid Pact is an agreement between air
carriers that provides that any participating carrier will receive payments from the
other participating carriers for any period during which that carrier is undergoing
a labor strike. Id. § 1382(c)(3)(A).
,, On August 12, 1986, for example, it was announced that seven unions "are
working on a joint strategy for their role in United Airlines' planned takeover of
Frontier Airlines." 7 Unions Map FrontierPlan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at D6,
col. 3. On January 12, 1987, Teamster Airline Division Director William Genoese
said "the union remains committed to organizing at Continental and is 'trying to
put a consortium together with other unions' including the Air Line Pilots Association to organize at Continental and other carriers owned by Texas Air Corporation." Ballots from 1983 Vote at Continental Unsealed; Teamsters Lose Bid to Represent
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The Airline Deregulation Act also established an employee protection plan (EPP) which contains provisions
for assistance payments to employees who are laid off or
furloughed as a result of bankruptcy or a fifteen percent
or more reduction in force.-3 Litigation delayed the implementation of this section until March 1987.32 Congress has never provided an appropriation to effectuate it,
however, and is apparently not likely to do so before October 22, 1988, when, by its terms, the provision
expires.3 3
Still another provision of the Airline Deregulation Act
gives airline employees who were employed on or before
October 24, 1978, and furloughed after four years of employment with a certificated carrier, the right, on or
before October 24, 1988, to preferential employment by
any airline seeking new employees.3 4 Nevertheless, such
furloughed employees retain seniority rights on the carrier that laid them off.3 5 The Act requires the Secretary of
Labor to maintain a national list of eligible employees.36
Litigation and administrative delays prevented the implementation of this section, also. This section was implemented on January 31, 1986, but it suffered a two month
suspension because of litigation. It was re-implemented it
on June 9, 1986. Meanwhile, expanding airline employment has obviated both its need and its utilization.3 7
Ground Employees, 7 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-I (Jan. 12, 1987). Such interunion cooperation in the industry has occurred for many years.
29 C.F.R. § 220.10 (1986).
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). In Alaska Airlines the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue whether the legislative veto written into
section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act, which provided for an employee pro-

tection provision, rendered the entire provision invalid. Id. at 1479. The Court
ruled that the legislative-veto provision was severable from the remainder of the
EPP program. Id at 1477.
49 U.S.C. § 1552j) (1982).
Id. § 1552(d)(1).
" Id.

- Id § 1552(d)(2).
.57 See Airline Employee Protection Program, 29 C.F.R. § 220 (1986), reprintedin

226 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at E-1-12 (Nov. 22, 1983); DOL Resumes Job Listing
Program to Aid Workers Who Lost Jobs After Air Deregulation, 108 DAILY LAB. REP.

(BNA) at A-4 (June 5, 1986).
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Rationalefor LPPs

The CAB enunciated its rationale behind the imposition of LPPs in numerous rulings. In United-Western, Acquisition Air CarrierProperty,"8 the first case involving this issue
in 1950, the CAB reasoned that some benefits of the route
transfer from Western to United would be "at the expense of some of the employees of the companies involved." 3 9 It quoted the United States Supreme Court,
saying that "the national interest in the stability of the labor supply available" was important, and "an obvious national interest in taking steps to see that route transfers
and mergers which are in the public interest should not be
prevented or delayed by labor difficulties arising out of
hardships to employees incident to such route transfers or
mergers.1 40 The CAB routinely reiterated such contentions in subsequent cases. 4 '
These arguments were grounded on two basic considerations. The first consideration, clearly borrowed from
the railroad industry, provided that laid-off employees
would have little chance of reemployment. The second
consideration, inherent in a regulated industry in which
competition was strictly limited, was the belief that no
competitor could take up the economic slack. The first rationale failed to recognize that the airline industry, unlike
the railroad industry, was an expanding industry in which,
despite cyclical setbacks, employment tended upwards
throughout its history. Deregulation, of course, demolished the second rationale. Since deregulation, any airline can enter any domestic market, and this has become
the norm whenever traffic justifies such action. Thus laidoff employees from a failed or declining carrier may have
opportunities with a new or expanding one.42
- 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1952).
,' Id. at 708.

41,Id. (quoting United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939)); see KAHN, supra
note 23, at 473.
41 See S. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, for a careful summary of these arguments.
-, No emergency board has been appointed pursuant to the statutory provi-
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Following deregulation, therefore, the CAB announced
in the NationalAirlines, Acquisition Case4 3 that it would order
44
LPPs only where required by "special circumstances.
Although the CAB did not implement this policy fully, the
DOT, which took over some of the duties of the defunct
CAB, has, as already noted, vigorously maintained this
position. The DOT pointed out in several cases that the
imposition of LPPs could cause the purchasing carrier to
veto the transaction. This would result in the loss ofjobs
for the employees of the merging carrier, which was in
extreme financial difficulty and likely to cease operation
without the transaction.45 In other cases, the DOT
pointed out that the parties had reached a merger agreement and LPPs were unnecessary. 46 This carefully enunciated policy has drawn the ire of the air transport unions
and has caused them to encourage the introduction into
Congress of H.R. 1101 and S. 943, as well as three bills in
sions of the Railway Labor Act in an airline case since the mid 1960s, because
sufficient competition exists to limit the impact of strikes. Actually no strikes have
occurred since deregulation that can be attributed directly to mergers. TheJohnson administration adopted this policy of not appointing emergency boards in
airline cases after a strike in 1966 which shut down five airlines but caused no
major disruption in commerce. An emergency board was appointed in the Wien
Air (Alaska) case in 1978, but this was a special case mandated by the 1978 deregulation statute at the request of the Air Line Pilots Association. See Northrup, The
New Employee-Relations Climate in Airlines, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 167, 172-73
[hereinafter New Employee-Relations Climate]; FORTY-Firm ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1979 at
28-29.
4- 84 C.A.B. 408 (1979).
4 Id. at 475. "LPPs will no longer be imposed as a matter of course, or because
tradition dictates their use." Id.
"5 See Southwest Airlines-Muse Air Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, D.O.T.
Order No. 85-6-79 at 33 (June 2, 1985) (Southwest indicated it would not complete the original transaction if LPPs were imposed; Muse was in serious financial
difficulties and needed the transaction to continue operation); Midway-Air Florida
Acquisition Show-Cause Proceeding, D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-33 at 3 (June 11,
1985) (Midway would not proceed with the acquisition if LPPs were imposed,
which would result in the denial ofjobs to Air Florida employees).
46 NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-7-81 at 22 (July 31,
1986)(private decision-making adequately protected the employees' interests); Pacific Div. Transfer Case, D.O.T. Order No. 85-12-1 (Dec. 12, 1985) (LPPs unnecessary because United made clear it was willing to discuss such issues with
employees).
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earlier Congresses, H.R. 5930 and S. 2666 in 1982, and
H.R. 4838 in 1986, all of which failed to be enacted into
law.47 As discussed below, one reason for opposition to
LPPs is that they provide special treatment for airline employees. A second reason is, of course, the cost, which
apparently has not been estimated carefully heretofore for
the airline industry and has been estimated in only a few
case studies for the railroad industry.48
III.

ESTIMATING LPP COSTS

The lack of cost data regarding LPPs is not surprising.
Perfectly accurate cost data can be developed only after
the fact. Projections are subject to error because changes
in traffic flow, new competition, and a host of other factors can alter such projections. Nevertheless, reasonably
reliable estimates can be made by utilizing realistic assumptions concerning employee furloughs, displacements, and moves that might be required in the case of
mergers of various sizes. To accomplish this, three hypothetical situations have been constructed. It has been
postulated that, as a result of a merger, three possible scenarios may occur: the closing of a carrier's major hub, of
one of its medium-sized hubs, and of one of its small
hubs.
A.

Three Scenarios Defined

None of these hypothetical hubs replicate exactly an existing one. Rather, they reflect actual situations that could
47

See supra notes 13-14.

See R. ABLES, supra note 25, for the railroad studies, which covered the pre1960 era. An unpublished study of the United-Capital airline merger of 1961,
made in 1966 by a Wharton School group under the present author's direction,
contains limited data on the costs of relocation, training, and extended fringe
benefits. Thus, United's estimated one-time merger costs for LPP purposes were
$4.3 million. By 1963 it had, however, lost two million dollars on homes involved
in relocation, and spent over one million dollars in training and over one million
dollars on extended fringe benefit coverage, in addition to the cost of displace"

ments and dismissals. See Northrup, Management and Merger: A Study of the 1961
Merger of Capital Airlines and United Air Lines 161-62 (1966) (unpublished study,
Wharton Industrial Research Unit).
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occur in a number of areas. For example, the large hub
scenario could take place at the Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, or New York airports. The medium-sized hub might
be at Miami, St. Louis, San Francisco, or Detroit. The
small hub could be found in Salt Lake City, Washington
D.C., or Nashville. Many other hubs would fit into these
categories which are not rigidly defined. It should be emphasized that when a hub is reduced or eliminated, so are
its spokes. The short flights that bring passengers into a
hub for connections become uneconomic when long haul
connecting flights no longer exist. Hence, the data in
each of the three scenarios reflect this fact.
TABLE 1
SYSTEM STATISTICS
Activity Reduction
Statistics
Daily ASMs
Daily Departures
Monthly Block
Hours
Monthly Pilot
Hours
Monthly Flight
Attendant Hours

Percent

Medium
Hub

Percent

Small
Hub

Percent

1,294,353
499
23,651

30
36
32

862,902
180
13,304

20
13
18

431,451
125
8,130

10
9
11

195,875

59,740

30

38,198

20

21,584

11

294,521

80,994

28

69,426

24

26,029

9

Base
Number

Large
Hub

4,314,511
1,385
73,909

Assumptions

" Each succeedingly larger hub is a multiple of the smallest hub in daily activity on
daily ASMs, i.e., the large hub has three times the daily activity of the small hub.
* ASM - available seat mileage.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF HEADcOUNT REDUCTIONS

Employee
Original
Large Hub Per- Medium Hub Per- Small Hub PerGroup
Complement Reductions cent Reductions cent Reductions cent
Pilots
3,699
1,124
30
740
20
406
11
Flight
Attendants
5,530
1,549
28
1,327
24
498
9
Station and Line
1,347
Maintenance
14,966
1,946
5,388
36
1,381
All Other
13,805
4,142
30
2,767
12,199
32
Total
38,000
6,780
3,632
Assumptions

"

Pilot reductions are based on reduced monthly Pilot hours.
" Flight Attendant reductions are based on reduced monthly Flight Attendant hours.
" Station and Line Maintenance reductions are based on reductions in Daily
Departures.
* All other reductions are based on the reduction in daily ASMs.

TABLE 3
PILOTS
Pilot
Equipment

B-727
DC-10
DC-9
B-757
Total

Utilization

Pilot

Hour
Reduction

Pilot
Reduction

Hour
Reduction

26,041
7,158
20,469
6,072
59,740

491
143
379
111
1,124

14,329
19,815
2,009
2,045
38,198

Pilot
Pilot
Reduction

Hour
Reduction

Pilot
Reduction

17,990
2,245
1,349
21,584

Assumptions

* Flying is reduced by aircraft type as reflected in the table above.
" Crew reductions are based on individual block hour reductions by type of aircraft.
* Pilot utilization is based on planned monthly pilot hours divided by headcount required on the monthly pilot bid.
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TABLE 4
FLIGHT ATrENDANTS
Base
Large
Medium
Small

Utilization

Flight Attendant
Hour Reductions

Flight Attendant
Reductions

52.3
52.3
52.3

80,994
1,549
69,426
1,327
26,029
498
Assumptions
" Flight Attendant hour cut backs are based on reductions for a mix of aircraft and do
not fall proportionally with block hour reductions, i.e., an hour of flight on a DC-10
has seven Flight Attendants compared to an hour on a B-727 which has four Flight
Attendants.
" Flight Attendant utilization is based on planned monthly'flight attendant hours, divided by the headcount required on the monthly flight attendant bid.

TABLE 5
STATION HEADCOUNT REDUCTION
CleriRamp
Stock Facility
Hub
Mgmt. Agent cal Skycap Service Cleaner Mechanic Clerk Service Total
Large
412 1,441 132
107 1,933
342
898
85
42 5,388
Medium 152
568 69
93
659
259
108
9
30
1,946
Small
127
460 27
14
527
45
141
5
2 1,347
Assumptions
* The Station Headcount Reduction is based on total reductions in departures at the
hub stations specified and the associated reductions in departures at downline
stations.
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TABLE 6
ALL OTHER REDUCTIONS

Employee Category
Base Maintenance
Reservations
SATOs

CTOs
Non-Management Staff
Management Staff
Foreign Employees

Total

Number of Employees

Large

Medium

Small

3,290
4,661

1,025
1,453

667
945

342
485

149

-

-

-

301
1,769
3,272

94
551
1,019

60
358
663

32
183
339

363

-

74

-

13,805

4,142

2,767

1,381

Assumptions

* These categories of employees have been directly related to ASMs.
" The reductions specified are in direct proportion to the ASM reductions reflected in
the closure of each hub.
* SATOs = Scheduled Airline Ticket Offices.
* CATOs = City Ticket Offices.

The basic data for the three scenario hubs are set forth
in Tables 1-6. Table 1 shows that the assumptions provide for each succeedingly larger hub to be a multiple of
the smallest hub in daily activity based upon available seat
miles (ASMs). The balance of the data in Table 1 comprises estimates of departures, block hours, and pilot and
flight attendant hours that are consistent with the ASMs.
The numbers and percentages under each hub show the
number and percentage of each hub's reductions for a
given level of reduced activity. (A more detailed explanation of the assumptions and methodology utilized in constructing the hubs and costs is found in Appendix B.)
Table 2 summarizes the headcount reduction by various
groups resulting from the closing of the various hubs,
while Tables 3-6 break down the same data by employee
classification. In these tables, assumptions also have been
made regarding the aircraft in use. For simplification,
only four aircraft types are assumed, but those chosen reflect varying cockpit and flight attendant complements so
that the assumptions involve realistic situations.
It is quite clear from Tables 1-6 that considerable
change would occur in all three hubs as a result of a shutdown of our mythical merged carrier's operations in any
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of the three projected scenarios. This is, of course, what
proponents of H.R. 1101 claim could happen and why
they advocate compulsory governmental imposition of
LPPs in such situations. The examination of the costs and
the implications of LPPs which follows, however, raises
serious questions about the viability of LPPs as job saving
instruments.
B.

The Wage-Cost Factor

Any analysis of the costs of LPPs must commence with
airline wages and salaries, which are among the highest in
industry. Table 7 provides a summary of contractual
wage data for 1986 based upon the top rate of the "A"
scale, as compiled by the Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIR Conference). The complete data are available from the AIR Conference. Figure 1 supports the
statement concerning the comparatively high wage and
salary scale of airline employees-sixty-nine percent
higher than the U.S. industry average-utilizing 1985 average wage data compiled by the Air Transport Association from figures supplied to the DOT by the airlines.
Although the high average wages are, of course, affected
by six figure pilots' salaries, Table 7 shows clearly that all
grades of employees are generously compensated.
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE AIRLINE WAGE BY EMPLOYEE
CLASSIFICATION
BASED ON Top RATE OF

SCALEEmployee
Classification
Agent and Clerical
Secretary
Clerk
Skycap
Switchboard Operator
Computer Operator
Accounting Clerk
Crew Scheduler
Reservation Sales Agent
Station Agent
Teletype Operator
Diatchers
Dispatcher
Assistant Dispatcher
Ground Crew&
Mechanic
Stock Clerk
Ramp
Fuelers
Cleaners-Aircraft
Cleaners-Facilities

Average Annual
Rate of Pay
$22,131
18,020
16,469
19,622.
26,247
19,541
29,714
26,335
27,134
28,148
$44,323
32,284
$32,926
27,394
27,373
27,435
24,294
21,798

"A"

1986
Employee
Classification

Average Annual
Rate of Pay

Flight Attendants

$ 27,913

Pilots'
Captain
DC-10
B-757b
B-727
DC-9

$101,676
112,956
96,048
84,516

1st Officer
DC-10

70,560

B-757b

76,716

B-727
DC-9

66,876
57,672

2nd Officer
DC-10
B-757
B-727
DC-9

59,400
N/A
57,132
N/A

Source: Airline Industrial Relations Conference
a. Pilot/flight attendant pay is an average annualized yield based on 75 hours per
month. This average includes the major and national carriers, but of course is
not a general average as set forth in Figure I and Table 8.
b. B-757 average wages are not as representative since there were only two
airlines using this type of aircraft when the data were collected.
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FIGURE 1
U.S. SCHEDULED AIRLINE INDUSTRY
COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE

1985
$43,100

$25,500

U.S.
Airlines

U.S.
Industry

In 1985, the average compensation for 355,000 airline employees was 69%
higher than the U.S. industry average.
COMPENSATION OF

U.S. AIRLINE
1985

EMPLOYEES

Workforce
Total
Workforce

Excluding
Pilots

Pilots (incl.
Co-pilots &
Fit. Engineers)

Compensation (incl. fringes, i.e.
social security, unemployment,
insurance and pension).
43,100
35,500
105,950
Wages (excl. fringes)
34,950
28,800
85,700
Airline employees are among the world's most highly compensated. This is the
result of collective bargaining and labor contracts in which the unions have
negotiated higher wages.
Source:
Air Tranport Association
July 1986

The high wages paid to airline employees are attributable both to the effects of regulation and to the service na-
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ture of the airline passenger business. As Bailey, Graham,
and Kaplan point out, "regulation's lack of price competition encouraged service competition and reduced carriers' incentives to control costs. In the 1960s when fares
did not fall as rapidly as costs, labor costs rose at the same
time service competition was increasing. '49 These authors then summarize the reasons why carriers under regulation failed to control labor costs.
First, during regulation carriers could not expand freely
by entering new markets, nor could they reduce prices to
take business from competitors. Moreover, inefficiency
was insulated because the CAB determined fares based on
average costs and often bolstered inefficient carriers by
awarding them new routes. The CAB would merge a carrier on the verge of failure with a prosperous carrier that
coveted its routes before the GAB would permit the
merged carrier to fail. For example, United took over
Capital in 1961, and Delta acquired Northeast about ten
years later. In both mergers the viability of the acquired
carrier was in serious doubt. Under such circumstances,
Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan state that "CAB regulation
substantially reduced the long-run payoff from achievement of a lean, efficient airline." 50
Opposition to union demands for uneconomic wages
and conditions had a minimum return for other reasons.
Generally, the carriers could pass high labor costs along
as higher fares. Then, too, strikes in service businesses are
very costly because the product cannot be warehoused.
Business lost during a strike is lost forever, and permanent losses may occur if potential passengers become accustomed to traveling on a competitive airline. In
addition, key airline employees are highly specialized and
licensed, making operation during a strike very risky and

even fatal if a serious accident occurs. Therefore, the airlines under regulation generally sought accommodation
- E. BAILEY,

(1985).
it Id. at 96.

D.

GRAHAM

& D.

KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES

95-96
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with unions on union terms. The unions could push up
wages and successfully demand uneconomic, or "featherbedding," make-work without fear of low-cost, nonunion
competitor companies taking the established carriers'
business at the expense of jobs of union members. As a
result, trunk airline wages on the major airlines rose much
more rapidly between 1967 and 1981 (when the impact of
deregulation began to be felt) than did wages in the nonfarm manufacturing sector. Indeed, "[i]f airline wages
had just remained competitive with the manufacturing
sector of the economy, pay per unit of output for the
trunk airlines would be 30 percent lower today."'
These high wages extend to all airline employee classes.
For example, in 1980 airline employees in such jobs as
keypunch operators earned thirty-one to eighty-two percent more than their counterparts in other industries. Positions such as pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants,
which are less comparable to jobs elsewhere, are also paid
considerably in excess of any reasonably comparable
work, leading to the conclusion that airline employee unions have been very successful in capturing a considerable
share of the industry's increased productivity.5 2
Table 8 adds further emphasis to the cost significance
of wages and salaries in the airline industry. This table
also demonstrates that, contrary to much discussion, employment has increased 15.3 percent during deregulation,
from 313,522 in 1978 to 361,375 in 1986. Although employment did decline between 1980 and the first quarter
of 1984, it did not decline below the 1978 figure. This
drop was most likely more attributable to the severe recession and to the strike of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers' Organization (PATCO), which restricted carrier expansion, than to deregulation.5" A careful study of
soId at 101.

Id at 102.
an analysis of the labor situation during this period, see New EmployeeRelations Climate, supra note 42, at 167-81; see also Northrup, The Rise and Demise of
PATCO, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 167 (1984).
52

-13
For
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airline deregulation by Morrison and Winston concluded
"that deregulation has not had an adverse effect on industry employment. ' 54 Meanwhile, during deregulation, average annual airline compensation per employee has risen
from $28,127 in 1978 to $42,218 in 1986, an increase of
50.1 percent, while the employee cost index rose from
179.6 to 269.6, also a 50.1 percent upward change. (The
fact that average annual wages per employee declined
slightly in 1986 is undoubtedly a function of heavy hiring
of new employees who begin at entry wages, retiring of
highly paid senior employees, and substituting of two-engine aircraft which have two pilots for three-engine aircraft which carry three pilots and have higher flight crew
wages.)
- S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTs OF AIRLINE DEREGULA-

TION 46 (1986).
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TABLE 8
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
LABOR COST INDEX
MAJORS AND NATIONALSa

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
I QTR 83
2 QTR 83
3 QTR 83

Total Cost
(S Millions)
8,865.69
4,104.37
4,580.77
5,172.87
5,621.11
6,014.79
6,710.08
7,685.35
8,818.54
10,355.18
11,600.33
12,413.41
12,578.72
3,268.14
3,313.35
3,397.58

Average
Number of
Employees
297,875
288,418
292,562
309,112
302,683
295,905
300,581
303,266
313,522
344,490
350,654
341,848
321,748
314,823
319,456
322,402

Average
Compensation
Per Employee
(Annualized)
12,978
14,231
15,657
16,735
18,571
20,327
22,324
25,342
28,127
30,059
33,082
36,313
39,095
41,524
41,487
42,153

4 QTR 83
1983

3
133486

3
31756

42.998
203

274

3,383.47
3,420.89
3,472.79

316,634
322,632
329,420

42,743
42,412
42,169

273.0
270.9
269.3

4 QTR 84

3,7.76i

9260413

1984
QTR 85
QTR 85
QTR 85
QTR 85

1,4
3,546.06
3,654.11
3,660.73
317

323683
325,362
332,315
345,646
45553

42,164
43,595
43,984
42,364
43.000

=La
278.4
280.9
270.6
274.A

3-4.
35.9
35.3
33.8
m

1 QTR 84
2 QTR 84
3 QTR 84

1
2
3
4

Cost Index
(1972=100)
82.9
90.9
100.0
106.9
118.6
129.8
142.6
161.9
179.6
192.0
211.3
231.9
249.7
265.2
265.0
269.2

Percent of
Total Cash
Operating
Expenses
46.0
46.1
46.9
45.8
41.6
40.9
41.4
41.5
41.7
38.9
35.2
34.7
35.0
37.0
36.0
35.1

36.1
34.7
34.3

2A

1985

14575.61

337219

41223

2

3_4_

1 QTR 86
2 QTR 86
3 QTR 86

3,789.41
3,776.88
3,886.55

351,014
358,617
369,834

43,182
42,127
42,036

275.8
269.1
268.5

35.3
35.6
36.4

4 QTR 86

3,803.75

366.037

41.567

MIA

5255

3135

42.218

26

1986

SOURCE: Compiled by Air Transport Association.
Majors include American, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Flying Tiger, Northwest, Pan
American, Piedmont (being acquired by US Air), Transworld (TWA), United, and US Air.
Nationals include Alaska, Aloha, Hawaiian, Midway, and Southwest.

We are thus dealing with employment in an industry
that continues both to expand and to pay steadily rising,

very high wages at the top rank of American industry.
The airline industry has mitigated some of these costs by
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decreasing compensation as a percent of total cash
operating expenses from 41.7 percent in 1978 to 36.2
percent in 1986. Elimination of restrictive work rules and
more effective labor utilization have added to efficiency. 55
Nevertheless, employee compensation in the industry is
among the highest in the world, and 36.2 percent of cash
operating expenses remains a very substantial cost
burden. The estimated costs of what a LPP would entail
in each of the three scenarios, as set forth below, clearly
demonstrate this fact, and reflect the already high
compensation in the industry.
C. Costs of LPPs-Three Scenarios
Given the assumed data for impact of a merger that
would eliminate each of three hubs, as set forth in Tables
1-6, and the real data concerning wages found in Tables 7
and 8 and Figure 1, we are now ready to estimate costs at
each of the three hubs. The costs are figured on the basis
of the key requirements of the standard LPP as described
in the summary above. Assumptions utilized in figuring
costs are set forth with the relevant data tables, and Appendix B contains more detailed explanations.
1. Dismissal and Displacement Costs
This is the largest cost item. The LPPs guarantee wages
for a period of four years to persons displaced to lower
rated jobs. Fringe benefits are also guaranteed concurrent with the dismissal/displacement benefit period. Dismissal allowances equal sixty percent of wages and
salaries and continue for a period of up to five years depending on the dismissed employee's seniority. Tables 911 show how this adds up. For the large hub, the cost
equals $286,350,399. For the medium hub, the cost
equals $120,883,804, and for the small hub, the cost
equals $64,731,423. Table 12 sets forth the special
, Id. at 43-46; see Mew Employee-Relations Climate, supra note 42.
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TABLE 9
LPP
DISMISSAL AND DISPLACEMENT

LARGE HUB

Employee
Group
Management
Pilots
F/As
Agents
Res. & CTOs
Non-Mgmt.
Clerical
Skycaps
Mech. and
Base Maint.
Cleaners
Stock Clerk
Facilities Ser.
Ramp Service
Total

Number of
Eligible
Employees

Dismissal
Costs

0 $
0
1,124 29,851,114
1,549 10,954,839
1,441
12.142,521
1,547 10,823,814
551
2,673.003
132
582,252
107
629,647
1,923 19,748,674

Projected Employee
Actual
Moves
Employee Resulting in DisplaceMoves Displacement ment Costs
301
1,822
1,549
1,282
774
0
0
0
1,354

0
2,058
0
112
67
0
0
0
812

2,642,398
1,264,334
302,187
43,042,364

209
90
36
537

42
9
0
215

10,776 $134,657,177

7,954

3,315

342
85
42
1,933

F/As = Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.

$

Total LPP
Costs

0$
112,164,825
0
5,525,596
3,173,124
0
0
0
27,612,442

0
142,015,939
10,954,839
17,668,117
13,996,938
2,673,033
582,252
629,647
47,361,116

82,004
43,931
0
3,091,300

2,724,402
1,308.265
302,187
46,133,664

$151,693,222 $286,350,399
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TABLE 10
LPP
DISMISSAL AND DISPLACEMENT

MEDIUM HUB

Employee
Group

Management

Number of
Eligible
Employees

Projected Employee
Actual
Moves
Employee Resulting in DisplaceMoves Displacement ment Costs

Dismissal
Costs

0 $

$

0$

Total LPP
Costs

0

176

0

Pilots
F/As
Agents

740
1,327
568

5,913,477
8,274,189
2,976,457

1,142
1,027
555

2,141
0
48

72,938,717
0
2,368,113

78,852,194
8,274,189
5,344,570

Res. & CTOs

1,005

6,194,133

503

44

2,083,843

8,277,976

Non-Mgmt.
Clerical
Skycaps
Mech. and
Base Maint.
Cleaners
Stock Clerk
Facilities Ser.
Ramp Service

358
69
93
775

1,663,547
304,359
495,373
6,828,525

0
0
0
216

0
0
0
54

0
0
0
1,836,295

1,663,547
304,359
495,373
8,664,820

259
9
30
659

1,919,302
68,706
204,930
5,649,067

208
345
78
198

42
104
0
40

82,004
507,641
0
575,126

2,001,306
576,347
204,930
6,224,193

5,892 $40,492,065

4,748

2,473

Total

F/As - Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.

0

$80,391,739 $120,883,804
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TABLE 11
LPP
DISMISSAL AND DISPLACEMENT
SMALL HUB

Employee
Group

Number of
Eligible
Employees

Management
Pilots
F/As
Agents
Res. & CTOs
Non-Mgmt.
Clerical
Skycaps
Mech. and
Base Maint.
Cleaners
Stock Clerk
Facilities Ser.
Ramp Service
Total

Dismissal
Costs

Projected Employee
Actual
Moves
Employee Resulting in DisplaceMoves Displacement ment Costs

0 $
0
406
2,581,827
498
1,950,168
460
2,231,460
517
2,816,055
183
807,213
27
119,097
14
49,973
483
4,255,713

75
812
299
392
244
0
0
0
282

0
1,576
0
34
23
0
0
0
71

45
5
2
527

315,810
38,170
13,662
4,271,845

0
0
0
111

0
0
0
10

3,167 $19,450,993

2,215

1,714

$

0$
40,050,287
0
1,677,413
994,561
0
0
0
2,414,388
0
0
0
143,781

Total LPP
Costs
0
42,632,114
1,950,168
3,908,873
3,810,616
807,213
119,097
49,973
6,670,101
315,810
38,170
13,662
4,415,626

$45,280,430 $64,731,423

F/As = Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.

TABLE 12
ASSUMPTIONS FOR TABLES 9-11

Displacement
*

All fringe benefits are included in displacement costs, except for medical
insurance. It is assumed that medical insurance is not a payroll related
fringe benefit and will remain constant, no matter what the payroll cost

variations.
*
*

Facilities services (cleaners/janitors) remaining after the termination are
absorbed by the system and no displacement occurs.
Station agents do not "bump" or displace a reservation agent. Both
groups of agents are assumed to move from full- to part-time agents
based on a system-wide percentage of part-time agents to all agents of

8.7%.
"

*

Actual pilot moves are assumed to result in a series of bumps, reflecting
the seniority hierarchy and the number of changes necessary to get each
remaining pilot into the proper slot.
Flight attendant displacement allowance is insignificant and not included.
The real difference includes the pay differentials between a few regular
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flight attendants and those that receive first flight attendant pay
premiums.
The ground crew employee moves are assumed to cause varying amounts
of displacements in the system in relation to the number of moves and
how well the system can absorb them. In 100 moves, it is assumed the
system can absorb 90%, with only 10 displacements; in 1000 moves only
50% will be absorbed resulting in 500 displacements.

Dismissal
Current employment levels are assumed to remain static; i.e., no changes
in numbers or seniority of employees. The closing of a hub occurs on
January 1st, with all employees having at least 1 year of seniority at the
time and eligibility for a minimum of 6 months dismissal allowance.
* The dismissal allowance includes all fringe benefits, with the exception of
medical insurance, in proportion to the 40% reduction in salary that is the
basis for the dismissal allowance calculation. Medical insurance is included at a fixed cost rate per employee.
* All termination benefits extend concurrently so that severance/furlough is
paid first and the dismissal allowance is paid next. Both benefit times together do not exceed the duration allowed as the dismissal allowance
maximum in the Labor Protective Provisions - 5 years.

These extraordinarily high costs may seem unrealistic to
someone not familiar with the airline industry. If one considers
how downsizing is practiced in the industry, however, it becomes clear that these scenarios are based upon practical models. For example, the airline miaht alter its equipment mix.
Pilots are compensated on the basis of the size and speed of the
aircraft, among other variables. Therefore, if DC-10 pilots are
moved to DC-9s, their higher DC-10 pay rate is maintained by
the LPP requirements. Moreover, DC-10s carry a three-man
flight crew, and DC-9s carry a two-man crew. The three DC-10
crew members then bump down, and those they bump exercise
their seniority over others, until the most junior personnel are
dismissed. All those downgraded in the process receive displacement allowances, and those dismissed receive dismissal
pay.
The same process governs all other employee classes. Senior
personnel bump into lower positions, and the downward exercise of seniority continues, causing the displacement of the
most junior personnel. Huge displacement allowances and dismissal payments result. Moreover, because the airlines employ
a substantial number of women, many two-breadwinner family
personnel are involved. Employees receive sixty percent dismissal pay with taxes reduced from full pay and have no obligation to work for up to five years. Dismissal pay permits a more
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relaxed home life, eliminates the need for paid child care, and
allows spouses to work intermittently on the side on a cash basis. These factors weaken the incentive to obtain another job
and thereby to reduce the carrier's liability.
Interestingly, our data show that the mechanics and base
maintenance operations have the highest displacement and dismissal costs. There are many grades of this class, and the numbers required are directly related to the equipment utilized.
Downsizing results in a plethora of bumps, triggering displacement allowances and dismissal payments in large amounts.
Mechanics have skills appropriate for many industries and most
could likely find nonairline industry jobs, although perhaps not
at the high compensation rates paid by the airlines.
Although the LPP costs for displacement and dismissal allowances as shown in Tables 9-11 are high, they are probably
underestimated. For one thing, they do not include the training costs and reduced productivity which inevitably result from
a series of such seniority exercising. Except for pilot training
costs, which are estimated and discussed below, no estimates
could reasonably be made for these very real costs. Yet, anyone cognizant of the industrial process knows that employees
in unfamiliarjobs require training and are less productive for a
period while they grow familiar with and competent in new positions. Moreover, in a service business like the airlines,
unfamiliarity with job details by employees in a new position
can materially affect customer satisfaction and future business.
Another reason why the estimated costs in Tables 9-11 may
understate actual costs is that the assumptions listed in Table
12 are necessarily restrictive in order to permit easier calculations. Bumping is restricted to one level moves, and pilot
length of service is very conservatively estimated. A real situation would probably not replicate these very limiting and costreducing assumptions.
2.

Pilot Re-Training

Table 13 shows estimated pilot training and retraining
costs. Pilots need retraining whenever they are transferred to new equipment. The extent and cost of such
training depend upon several factors including the pilot's
previous experience, the nature of equipment, and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) rules. As a result, the size
of the hub is not the only guiding variable. The extent of
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equipment, route changes, etc., may be even more significant. Nevertheless, a larger hub does mean that more
people are displaced, thus involving more training and
greater costs. If data for the cost of training and retraining nonpilot employees could be developed, the hub size
would undoubtedly become a more dominant factor, because equipment size and routes would then not necessarily be the significant factors. Pilot retraining and training
costs of over twenty million dollars for the large hub,
about thirteen million dollars for the medium one, and
nearly eight million dollars for the small one emphasize
the significance of the carrier's liability.
TABLE 13
PILOT RETRAINING RESULTING
FROM DISPLACEMENT

Small Hub
Medium Hub
Large Hub

Total Pilot

Total Pilot

Total Retraining

Reduction

Retraining

Costs

406
740
1,124

1,689
3,075
4,807

$ 7,628,463
12,928,235
20,321,504

Assumptions:
* There is a 40:60 ratio of those pilots who need initial training to those who need
retraining. This ratio, which is believed to be realistic, is utilized.
" Training costs include pilot pay plus a cost of living allowance of $1.40/hr. for 24
hrs/day, plus $30/day for a hotel.
" DC-10 initial training per crew includes the cost of one day of actual flight time of
$5,600 for fuel, maintenance and landing rights.
" With the amount of retraining required it is necessary either to shut the airline
down or reduce the size of the workforce by multiple bids. This necessitates
multiple retraining and causes the number of retrainings to exceed the size of the
workforce.

3.

Severance Costs

Table 14 estimates the severance costs for the three
hubs, and Table 15 lists the assumptions underlying the
estimates. Again these assumptions are conservative, especially in regard to management seniority and vacation
pay, but the amounts are substantial with $32.8 million
for the large hub, $13.3 million for the medium hub, and
$6.3 million for the small hub.
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TABLE 14
SEVERANCE COSTS
Earned
Vacation

Payoff
Hub

Class ofEmloee

No. of
Employees

Severance
Expense

Severance

As a Result And Vacation
Expense
Of Severance

Facilities Service
Ramp Service
Stock Clerk
Mech. & Base Maint.
Airline Service
Agents
Clerical
Non-Management
Skycaps
Pilots
Flight Attendants
Management
Total Emp. Reduction

1,592
2 $
527
521,977
5
4,592
483
530,527
45
37,116
591,353
976
27
13,068
183
88,572
14
4,984
406
426,099
498
262,298
466
672,040
3,632 $ 3,154,218

$

1,592
521,977
4,592
530,527
37,116
591,353
13,068
88,572
4,984
410,633
262,298
672,040
$ 3,138,752

$

Medium Facilities Service
Hub
Ramp Service
Stock Clerk
Mech. & Base Maint.
Airline Service
Agents
Clerical
Non-Management
Skycaps
Pilots
Flight Attendants
Management
Total Emp. Reduction

30 $
23,880
659
699,807
9
8,262
775
850,950
229,167
259
1,572
1,080,025
69
33,396
358
186,126
44,310
93
740
1,732,180
1,327
921,078
815
1,175,348
6,780 $ 6,984,524

$

23,880
699,807
8,262
850,950
229,167
1,080,025
33,396
186,126
44,310
1,063,498
921,073
1,175,348
$ 6,315,842

$

Facilities Service
Ramp Service
Stock Clerk
Mech. & Base Maint.
Airline Service
Agents
Clerical
Non-Management
Skycaps
Pilots
Flight Attendants
Management
Total Emp. Reduction

42 $
35,767
1,933
3,520,459
85
100,989
1,923
2,542,825
319,073
342
2,980
2,262,014
132
63,888
551
303,625
107
51,478
1,124
6,881,438
1,549
1,113,730
1,431
2,099,413
12,199 $19,294,699

$

$

Small
Hub

Large
Hub

35,767
2,691,267
100,989
2,542,825
319,073
2,262,014
63,888
303,625
51,478
1,994,062
1,113,730
2,064,075
$13,542,793

3,184
1,043,954
9,184
1,061,054
74,232
1,182,706
26,136
177,144
9,968
836,732
524,596
1.344,080
$ 6,292,970
47,760
1,399,614
16,524
1,701,900
458,334
2,160,050
66,792
372,252
88.620
2,795,678
1.842,146
2,350,696
$13,300,366
71,534
6,211.726
201,978
5,085,650
638,146
4,524,028
127,776
607,250
102,956
8,875,500
2,227.460
4,163,488
$32,837,492
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TABLE 15
SEVERANCE ASSUMPTIONS
Seniority levels system wide affected by the closing of a hub and resulting in termination, determined the level of seniority terminated at the closed hub. All
others at the hub are dispersed into the system. Example:
0-1 years seniority
1-2 years seniority
Total Reductions
Total at Hub
Total dispersed to system 200

-

Reduction in System
100
300
400
200
60
140

Reductions in Hub
20
40
60

Assumptions:

" Fringe expense includes group insurance, pension, FICA, and Worker's Compensation
for each class of worker. Fringe benefits end with the last severance payment or LPP
dismissal payment.
" Management seniority is proportional to non-management seniority since a specific
breakdown of management seniority was not available.
* All workers were assumed to be full-time, non-probationary employees with at least I
year of seniority.
* Severance policy has 2 weeks ofseverance for employees with up to 3 years of service with
a week for each additional year of service up to 16 weeks.
" The effective date of the employee reduction is assumed to be January 1st. Severance
policy pays out earned vacation from previous year, before severance pay is initiated.
Total severance cost is the sum of earned vacation and severance pay. Accrued vacation,
although normally part of the severance payout, is not included because it would be zero
on January I st.
" Pilot's severance policy requires 45 days' notice of reduction in force. It is assumed that
this notice is included in the time period that it takes to retrain pilots for new positions in
the reduced workforce.

4.

Moving Costs and Real Estate Assistance

The airlines have a three year obligation to move employees and their families and provide real estate assistance when leases are broken and homes cannot be sold
for "fair value." Tables 16-18 contain estimated moving
costs, again not trivial, for each of the three hubs. Table
19 describes the assumptions used in figuring these costs.
Table 20 estimates real estate assistance costs. Table 20
assumes that houses would sell below cost in fifteen percent of the cases. If a hub located in a depressed real estate area such as Denver or Houston in 1985-87, however,
then the carrier would incur moving costs much greater
than those set forth in Table 20, because houses would
sell below cost in far more than fifteen percent of the
cases.
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TABLE 16
MOVING COSTS

LARGE HUB
Cost of all
No. of Eligible Projected Actual
Employee Moves Employee Moves Cost/Move Employee Moves
Class of Employees
1,202
$ 5,100
$ 1,535,100
301*
Management
25,000
600,000
24*
Real Estate Assist.
1,822"*
5,100
9,292,200
911
Pilots
5,100
7,899,900
1,549
1,549
Flight Attendants
1,282
5,100
1,282
6,538,200
Agents
1,547
774***
5,100
3,947,400
Reservations & CTOs
Non-Management
0****
0
85
Staff
0****
0
Clerical
101
0
48
Skycaps
1,354"*
5,100
6,905,400
677
Mech. & Base Maint.
5,100
1,065,900
209
209
Cleaners
5,100
90
459,000
90
Stock Clerk
5,100
183,600
36
Facilities Service
36
5,100
2,738,700
1,073
5375*5
Ramp Service
8,810
$41,165,400
7,954
Total
Assumptions:
* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 27 who receive real estate
assistance.
I1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
. For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
.. Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this
level will not move.
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TABLE 17
MOVING COSTS

MEDIUM HUB
No. of Eligible Projected Actual
Cost of all
Employee Moves Employee Moves Cost/Move Employee Moves
Class of Employees
$ 5,100
$ 897,600
176"
Management
652
Real Estate Assist.
13"
25,000
325,000
5,100
1,142"*
5,824,200
Pilots
571
Flight Attendants
1,327
1,327
5,100
6,767,700
Agents
555
5,100
2,830,500
555
1.005
5,100
2,565,300
Reservations & CTOs
503***
Non-Management
0
Staff
55
0O**
0
68
Clerical
00**
0
Skycaps
101
108
216*
5,100
1,101,600
Mech. & Base Maint.
1,060,800
208
5,100
Cleaners
208
345
5,100
1,759,500
Stock Clerk
345
5,100
397,800
Facilities Service
78
78
Ramp Service
5,100
395
198"**
1,009,800
$24,539,800
5,468
4,748
Assumptions:
* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 2% who receive real estate
assistance.
I1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
** For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this
level will not move.
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TABLE 18
MOVING COSTS

SMALL HUB
No. of Eligible Projected Actual
Employee Moves Employee Moves Cost/Move
Class of Employees
298
75*
$ 5,100
Management
6*
Real Estate Assist.
25,000
5,100
406
812*
Pilots
5,100
299
299
Flight Attendants
5,100
Agents
392
392
5,100
244***
Reservations & CTOs
488
Non-Management
Staff
Clerical
0
0
Skycaps
141
282**
5,100
Mech. & Base Maint.
0
Cleaners
0
0
0
Stock Clerk
0
0
Facilities Service
1II**
5,100
221
Ramp Service
21-5
Total
2,253

Cost of all
Employee Moves
$ 382,500
150,000
4,141,200
1,524,900
1,999,200
1,244,400

0
1,438,200
0
0
0
566,100
$11,446,500

Assumptions:
* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 27 who receive real estate
assistance.
1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
*
For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
* Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this
level will not move.
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TABLE 19
*
"

"
*

*

"
*
"

•

MOVING ASSUMPTIONS
One airline analysis showed average moving costs to be $5,100. In addition management employees were eligible for real estate assistance. An
average management cost an additional $25,000.
The number of eligible moves is generated by the greater of: 1. the
number of employees at the closed hub; or 2. the number of employees
reduced in the system by the closing of a hub. This does not include pilots and flight attendants who are assumed to move less often because of
the ability to commute.
Pilots eligible for a move were assumed to be equal to the size of the
system reduction, less those pilots terminated at the hub.
Flight attendants eligible for a move were equal to the actual size of the
reduction in flight attendants for the medium and large hub scenarios. In
the small hub the eligible moves were assumed equal to half of the reduction in the system since there were no flight attendants stationed at the
hub.
Agent and ramp servicer eligible moves are a ratio of the number of agent
and ramp servicer reductions in the system to the number of agent and
ramp servicer reductions at the hub, multiplied times the number of nonterminated agents and ramp servicers at the hub.
Mechanics and Base Maintenance.
Small and large hubs have only line maintenance.
Medium hub has mainly base maintenance.
Small and large hubs assume that line mechanic moves are equal to a ratio
of the total number reduced in the system to the total at the hub, times the
number of non-terminated mechanics at the hub. Base maintenance system moves are assumed to be zero, since they will come out of the base
maintenance facility at low seniority levels.
Medium hub assumes that all system mechanic reductions will result in a
move. Base maintenance reductions will come out of the lowest levels of
base maintenance seniority in this city since this is where all the junior
mechanics are located. Any movement between line and base is not an
expense since the hub and base are in the same location.
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TABLE 20
LPP REAL ESTATE
ASSISTANCE
Projected Renters Total Costs Homeowners
Total
Total
Actual
w/Lease
to Break
Who Do Not
Cost
LPP
Employee Breaking Employee
Receive Fair
For Fair
R.E.
Moves
Costs
Leases
Market Value
Market
Assist.
Small Hub
2,215
277
$221,500
249
$1,658,340 $1,879,940
Medium Hub
4,748
594
$475,200
534
$4,640,460 $5,115,660
Large Hub
7,954
994
$795,200
895
$6,130,750 $6,925,950
LPP Real Estate assistance insures fair market value (not including the effects of the
acquisition on the value of Real Estate) in the selling of an employee's home. In addition it
insures the costs associated with breaking a lease of those renters required to relocate.
ASSUMPTIONS:
* 25% of Projected Actual Employee moves are renters; 75% are homeowners.
* 50% of renters will have to incur costs associated with breaking their lease. $800 is the
assumed cost, which is equal to two months rent.
* 15% of homeowners will not receive fair market value for their home. They will receive
only 90%7 of the fair market value.
* Average home value based on 1980 U.S. Census Statistics updated to 1984 by the U.S.
Census Bureau and verified as still relevant through 1986.
Small Hub
Medium Hub
Large Hub

D.

$66,600
$86,900
$68,500

Total Estimated Costs
The total estimated costs for each hub are set forth in
Table 21. They are indeed awesome, totaling
$387,600,745 for the large hub, $176,717,865 for the medium hub, and $91,999,296 for the small hub. Although
these data do not include either the very real costs for
training and retraining employees or the productivity
losses resulting from the exercise of seniority by all
nonpilot employees, we believe that these cost scenarios
both conservatively and realistically reflect what might occur under the conditions specified.
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TABLE 21
LPP COSTS-THREE HUB SIZES
Large Hub

Medium Hub

Small Hub

Total Costs

387,600,745

176,717,865

91,999,296

Dismissal and Displacement
Pilot Re-Training
Severance
Moving Costs
Real Estate Assistance

286,350,399
20,321,504
32,837,492
41,165,400
6,925,950

120,833,804
12,928,235
13,300,366
24,539,800
5,115,660

64,731,423
7,628,463
6,292,970
11,466,500
1,879,940

Source: Tables 1-20.

E. Costs and Benefits of Different Employee Classes
The data presented thus far estimate the total costs
mandated by LPPs for employee displacements, dismissals, and related shifts. Tables 22 and 23 estimate how
much these benefits cost the carriers while benefitting individuals in key classes. In Table 22 the illustrations of
costs include the transfer of a captain from a DC-10 to a
Boeing 757. Since the former aircraft is larger and heavier, both factors which figure in the pay rate, the carrier
would pay $45,653 for having the captain perform the
same work on a different aircraft. If the carrier transferred a first officer from a DC-10 to the same position on
a Boeing 727, the carrier would pay nearly $63,000, again
for having him do the same job on a smaller, lighter
plane. An agent going from full to part-time work would
cost the carrier the most-$73,216 even though the salary
would be considerably below that of a pilot.
These costs could be the highest where a carrier's
equipment is the newest. The Boeing 707, 727 and the
older classes of the Boeing 747, the DC-8, the DC-10, and
the Lockheed L- 1011 all require a three-man crew and are
scheduled to be phased out of service. Newer aircraft all
require only two pilots. Thus, if a modernly equipped airline merges with a carrier that has not kept its equipment
current, second officers are certain to be displaced or dismissed and others changed to different aircraft as the sur-
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viving carrier concentrates its fleet on newer types of
aircraft. The LPP costs involved can then be huge.
Table 23 shows the costs and benefits which might accrue to employees dismissed as a result of a merger if a
LPP were in effect. The costs are severe and the benefits
are liberal indeed, varying from $507,935 for a DC-10
captain to $118,527 for an agent. There is no precedent
in American industry for dismissal pay of such magnitude
for nonexecutive employees. LPPs clearly involve very
high benefits to a small number of already highly paid
employees.
Some mergers do not involve the dissolution of the acquired carrier's hub. For example, American's acquisition
of Air California5 6 did not result in the dissolution of Air
California's hub, because American did not have a strong
representation in the California market. Even that
merger, however, involved substantial employee moves
and eliminated the Air California headquarters office.
The merger is also likely to result in the disposal of various Air California aircraft that are incompatible with
American's fleet. In turn, this will involve the transferring, training, and downgrading of flight crew and
mechanics. If conducted under LPPs, all of these moves
would have remained excessively costly for several years.
so American Airlines, Inc. and ACI Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-3-80
(Mar. 30, 1987).
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TABLE 22
COSTS AND BENEFITS TO SELECTED
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE FOR
DISPLACEMENT
Total Cost
for Displacement Period

Employee Group

Seniority

Original Annual
Wage Without
Fringe

Captain DC-10 to
Captain B-757
F/O DC-10 to
F/O B-727
F/O B-727 to
S/O B-727
Agent Full- to
Part-time
Mechanic to
Ramp
Ramp to Cleaner

12th

123,678

40,553

5,100

45,653

85,636

57,867

5,100

62,967

74,095

42,313

5,100

47,413

7th

29,660

68,116

5,100

73,216

8th

31,140

23,443

5,100

28,543

8th

27,483

16,724

5,100

21,824

Displace- Moving
Cost
ment Cost

Assumptions:
" Employee is at peak pay and seniority.
" Displacement includes fringe benefits.
" A moving cost is assumed to occur for the employee displaced for our example,
although a move is not always an occurrence in a displacement.
" F/O = First Officer; S/O = Second Officer.
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TABLE 23
COSTS AND BENEFITS TO SELECTED EMPLOYEES
ELIGIBLE FOR DISMISSAL
Annual
Annual Rate of
Rate of
Pay
Severance Severance Dismissal
Pay
w/Fringe
Period
Costs
Costs
Captain DC-10 123,678
F/O DC-10
85,636
S/0 DC-10
75,948
F/A
34,018
Agent
29,660
Mechanic
36,327
Ramp
81,140

161,004 5 months
111,481 5 months
98,869 5 months
41,362 16 weeks
36,666 16 weeks
44,522 16 weeks
38,165 16 weeks

67,085
46,450
41,195
12,727
11,282
13,699
11,743

56,108
39,418
35,168
17,146
15,823
19,362
16,951

Total
Costs
First
Year

Total for
Dismissal
Period

123,193
85,868
76,363
29,873
27,105
33,061
28,694

507,935
356,164
317,514
128,941
118,527
144,930
126,622

Assumptions:
* Severance and dismissal extend concurrently so that severance is paid first and dismissal
is paid next.
* Employee is at peak pay and seniority.
• Employee is eligible for maximum dismissal.
* Severance includes total fringe benefits.
* Dismissal costs include fringe benefits that are payroll related at 60%; non-payroll related
benefits (i.e., medical, dental, etc.) are at a fixed cost.
* Accrued vacation payoff is not included for these employees. Prior to the start of
severance there would normally be a period of vacation paid or taken.
* F/O = First Officer, S/O = Second Officer; F/A = Flight Attendant.

IV.

SOME ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

It would be fatuous to assume that LPP costs of this nature do not alter decision making by workers and management. Indeed, ample evidence exists that LPPs have a
profound impact. Earlier, it was noted that the prohibition of layoffs in the railroad industry effectively barred
mergers during the early 1930s. 57 A commentator found
that the turndown of the Santa Fe-Southern Pacific
merger by the Interstate Commerce Commission was
likely to cause railroads to emphasize reducing labor costs
instead of seeking economies in mergers.
Industry executives say they would be forced to address
their basic operating and labor problems that they were
reluctant to tackle as long as cost efficiencies from merging were available. 'There will be a lot of labor unrest,'
-7 REHMUS, supra note 24.
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says Anthony Sarkis, president of the National Industrial
Transportation League, a shipper group. 8
Finding that mergers did not solve the railroads' basic
high labor cost problem, this commentator then declared
that the opposite may be true:
In fact, mergers may have added to the railroads' labor
costs. One reason is that labor unions have negotiated job
protection agreements in exchange for their support of
the mergers ....
'I worked maybe a month last year, but I
still collected my paycheck every week,' says David
Halterman, a former clerk for the Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad. Mr. Halterman left a protected job for one that
he said offered opportunity for advancement. Plus, he
says that at 33, he is 'a little young to be retired.'59
Several airlines have made it clear that the imposition of
LPPs would have altered their plans, or indeed did so, to
the detriment of both airline employment and the American economy. In two recent cases, for example, carriers
took over airlines in, or close to, bankruptcy, thus saving
numerous jobs. The first case, the Midway-Air Florida
Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding,6 ° involved Midway's
purchase of certain operations and facilities of Air Florida,
which was in bankruptcy. Midway asserted that if the
DOT imposed a LPP on the transaction, it would not proceed with its plan, which included employing many of Air
Florida's employees who were forced out of their jobs by
the bankruptcy. 6 ' No other airline appeared interested in
Air Florida. The DOT correctly concluded that the imposition of a LPP would be detrimental to Air Florida
employees.62
58 Machalaba, Railroads May Be Forced to Cut Costs After ICC Reection of Proposed
Merger, Wall St. J., July 28, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
50 Id. at col. 4.
- D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-33 (June 11, 1985).
- Id. at 3. "Midway had stated it would not proceed with the acquisition if
LPP's were imposed, that the imposition of LPP's would presumably cause Midway to abandon the transaction, and that the net result would be the denial ofjobs
to the Air Florida employees." Id.
w2To Ensure FairTreatment of Airline Employees in Airline Mergers and Similar Transactions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
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Southwest's takeover of Muse in Southwest Airlines-Muse
Air Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding63 was a similar case.
Muse was not in bankruptcy, but it was rapidly running
out of cash and would probably have had to cease operations rather quickly if not rescued by a takeover. Since
Muse operated almost parallel to Southwest, the latter
could have purchased equipment and probably won most
of the Muse traffic if Muse went out of business. Hence
Southwest emphatically stated that it would not take over
Muse and save the jobs of the employees if the DOT were
to impose a LPP. Again, the DOT concluded that the LPP
would be a detriment, not a benefit, to employees.64
The threat of a LPP can also limit, or even destroy, the
ability of a carrier that has gone bankrupt to revive itself
and rehire some employees. Furthermore, it can restrict
the ability of carers to purchase equipment. For example, Braniff's ability to revive from bankruptcy as a small
carrier was undoubtedly conditioned upon its selling
many of its aircraft. The carrier that purchased several
such aircraft clearly would not have done so if the transaction had been covered by a LPP.. 5
Further evidence indicates that the mandatory imposition of LPPs as required by H.R. 1101, or threats thereof,
can materially affect equipment purchased and the balance of payments as well as employment. For example,
one carrier purchased used aircraft abroad rather than in
the United States while Congress was considering enacting LPP legislation in 1982 in order to avoid coverage if
such legislation were enacted. 66 Such overseas transactions not only cost Americans jobs, but also further inflate
the deficit in the United States' balance of payments.
Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1986) (testimony of Matthew V.
Scocozza, Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation) [hereinafter Hearings].
' D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-79 (June 2, 1985).
- Hearings,supra note 62, at 29. Muse, renamed, later ceased operations.
".,
Hearings, supra note 62, at 114 (testimony of Robert E. Cohn, then general
counsel, People Express Airlines).
Id. at 110.
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The United Airlines-People Express-Texas Air deals involving Frontier afford a good example of how costs can
determine whether mergers can be effectuated and jobs
can be preserved. As part of its arrangement to buy Frontier, United agreed to purchase some of Frontier's Denver
airport gates, two hangars, and certain of its aircraft.6 7
The deal depended upon United reaching a satisfactory,
cost-efficient labor agreement (with, no doubt, no LPPs)
with its pilots. United found it impossible to achieve such
an agreement. Frontier had earlier become clearly a nonviable airline close to\ bankruptcy, which led to its
purchase by People Express in late 1985 and to drastic
wage reduction agreements.6 8 Frontier's continued losses
of about ten million dollars per month devastated People
Express and resulted in People Express' proposed sale to
United six months later. Texas Air Corporation finally acquired People Express, Frontier included, after Frontier
69
declared bankruptcy.
The original deal for United's purchase of Frontier collapsed because the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
chapter refused United's proposal to hire Frontier pilots
on its "B" scale. The "B" scale is the lower of the two-tier
pilot salary scale negotiated for new employees. After five
years, the former Frontier pilots would have achieved "A"
status. According to United, this would have meant an
' This deal was never fully consummated, although United did make a downpayment to Frontier just prior to Frontier's bankruptcy. In 1985 the beleaguered
Frontier sold twenty-five of its seventy-seven planes to United. United did not
gain possession of the gates and hangars involved in the proposed 1986 deal
before Frontier filed for bankruptcy, however. After Texas Air purchased Frontier, a court ruled that Frontier, as an indirect unit of Texas Air, could maintain
control of the hangars and gates until the issue could be fully adjudicated as part
of Frontier's bankruptcy case. This left the facilities to be utilized by Continental,
the Texas Air subsidiary which had already assumed Frontier's operations. To
avoid long litigation, Texas Air and United settled out of court. Texas Air kept
the assets and transferred fifty-five million dollars to Frontier. Frontier then reimbursed United forty million dollars. Texas Air to Buy Gates, Hangarsfor $55 Million,
Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
People Express, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 85-11-58 (Nov. 20, 1985).
Texas Air Corp. and People Express, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-53 (Oct.
24, 1986).
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approximate $50,000 increase over this period. Absent
an agreement with the pilots, United exercised its option
to void the merger. People Express then put Frontier in
bankruptcy, throwing all the latter's employees out of
work. After Texas Air purchased People Express, including Frontier's assets, some former Frontier employees accepted positions with Continental, the subsidiary of Texas
Air. Many employees, however, took the severance pay
that Texas Air offered without the compulsion of a LPP.
United employed some of these employees, including pilots. Under the seniority rules these former Frontier employees came in as new United employees at the bottom
of the "B" scale. Those employees who joined Continental were employed under pay scales lower than the Frontier pay scales. Thus, the failure of the United pilots to
agree to United's terms was costly indeed to many Frontier employees. °
The drastic job damage to Frontier employees in this
situation would have occurred even if the DOT had im70 Frontier's basic equipment was the Boeing 737. According to data provided
by the Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIRCON), the seventy-five hour
annualized yield in 1986 for a Frontier captain on this plane was $4,960 per
month, or $59,520 per year. The captains flying the same equipment for United
had annualized yields of $8,597 per month, or $103,164 per year, resulting in an
annual difference between Frontier and United pilots of $43,644. Continental did
not operate the Boeing 737 before taking over the bankrupt Frontier. On the
comparable DC-9, also a two-engine plane with similar characteristics and usages
to the earlier model 737s, Continental captains had annualized yields of $4,288
per month, or $51,456 per year. This amount was $8,064 less per year than the
Frontier figure, and $51,708 less per year than that of United.
At the time of the proposed merger, a Boeing 737 captain at Frontier was reportedly paid $68,400 by Frontier and $115,000 by United, a difference of
$46,600. The United chapter of ALPA demanded that the gap be closed in eighteen months. Frontier employees had no voice in the negotiations, which sealed
the airline's fate. Whatever the exact differential of pay between annual earnings
of captains at United and Frontier, it was approximately $40,000-50,000, and the
captains' earnings at Continental remained below those at Frontier. (Details were
extensively reported in the press during the summer of 1986. For a summary, see
United Holds Off on Bid to Buy Frontier, Says Impasse with Pilots Imperils Purchase, 150

DA LY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3-4 (Aug. 5, 1986)).

The failure of United's attempt to purchase Frontier has hurt both it and its
pilots. Now that Continental controls Frontier's former gates and hangars, it has
replaced United as the No. 1 carrier in Denver, and United pilot job opportunities
have been lost.
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posed a LPP. United has assured this writer that it would
have declined to rescue Frontier's employees from bankruptcy and unemployment if required to implement LPP
terms, even if United's pilots would have acceded to the
carrier's merger proposal. In addition to the displacement and dismissal costs, United was especially concerned
about housing costs because of the severely depressed
and overbuilt Denver housing market where most of
Frontier's employees lived. Again, the employees would
have suffered from legislation that is avowedly being
pushed for their supposed benefit. Moreover, LPP legislation is likely to be more damaging than intransigent
union policy, both because legislation is more far reaching and because legislation, unlike union policies, cannot
be changed through negotiation. Texas Air made it very
clear that it would not have purchased the bankrupt Frontier and the near bankrupt People Express if a LPP had
magnified the purchase price.
It should be emphasized that the carrier opposition to
LPPs is not grounded upon opposition to integrating seniority lists, to paying severance to displaced employees, or
to reimbursing employees for specified moving expenses.
Carriers have done all these things in the major mergers
approved since the DOT has declined to order the implementation of LPPs. What the carriers want, and what
would appear to be inherent in a free employee relations
system, is to implement a fair system that is both efficient
and predictable from a cost standpoint through negotiation with union employees and application to nonunion
employees. LPPs as instituted in the past or as contemplated by legislation involve excessive, unpredictable
costs. Moreover, by guaranteeing extraordinary payments in case of adversity to employees whose wages are
already substantially above the average of employees in
comparable jobs in other industries, the LPPs imposed by
the government act unfairly to the carriers and to the consumers who must pay the ultimate costs.
The enactment of LPP legislation may preclude future
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mergers in the airline industry. This may well be the
short-term objective of the airline unions which support
such regulation. A reduction in airline mergers, however,
would clearly not result in employment stability or security. Most observers, for example, believe Pan American
has little potential for long-term survival in its present
form. 7 ' Pam American has already sold its most profitable
assets, i.e., the Intercontinental Hotel chain, the New
York City office building, and the Pacific routes, and apparently it may also dispose of its New York to Boston and
to Washington, D.C. shuttle.72 Pan American basically
must depend upon its highly competitive North Atlantic
and South American routes and its weak domestic network to survive. One hears frequent rumors that the company is for sale, but an aging workforce, older, less
efficient aircraft, and other liabilities reduce Pan American's merger potential. Additionally, if a LPP is required
for a merger, it would greatly hinder the deal. Then, Pan
American, which has already lost more than two billion
dollars since 1979, its last profitable year," might well be
forced to cease operations and to liquidate. Various domestic and foreign carriers would assume its routes, and
its employees would lose their jobs instead of many gaining positions with the acquiring carrier. Once again, a law
requiring a LPP would have a decidedly negative effect on
the employees that it was purportedly designed to
protect.
A.

Other Adverse Impacts

The basic assumptions underlying the arguments of
LPP proponents is that LPPs will protectjobs and guaran71 See, e.g., Bennett, Pan Am's DisappearingAct, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, § 8, at
1, col. 2; Carley, A PanAm Takeover Would Boost Rivalry, Wall St.J.,Jan. 19, 1987, at

2, col. 2.
72 Schmitt, Pam Am Threatens Shuttle Service End, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1987, at 18,
col. 5 (Pan Am told its employees that it will sell the shuttle if it does not become

profitable).
7C
Carey & Agins, Pan Am to Post Net Lossfor '86 of $400 Million, Wall St.J., Feb.
13, 1987, at 8, col. 3.
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tee income without causing adverse reactions. The incidents cited indicate the weakness of such propositions. In
fact, by adding to costs, LPPs are likely to force air fares
upward and thereby discourage traffic. As airline employees who have suffered during recessions well understand,
less traffic means fewer jobs.
LPP proponents also assume that employees who are
laid off or dismissed because of airline mergers or similar
activities will have few or no opportunities for employment in the industry. This is certainly inaccurate today
when airline employment is expanding. Pilots and other
flight crew members are very much in demand. Indeed,
for the first time in many years airlines are encouraging
applications from pilots who are trained elsewhere than in
the armed services because the need for pilots is so
great.7 4 Machinists and clerical employees find opportunities not only among airlines, but among many other industries as well, and mechanics are now also in short
supply among several airlines.
B.

Generous Unemployment Compensation

LPPs provide the most generous unemployment compensation system in American history. Generally, state
unemployment compensation laws provide for payments
over a twenty-six week period. Occasionally, in times of
recession such payments have been extended up to sixtyfive weeks. The LPPs extend this duration of unemployment compensation to five years. In addition, provisions
guaranteeing wages and benefits regardless of the job
held or ofjob downgrading are not usually found in union
contracts because of their extreme costs, except where
such moves to lower rated jobs are short, temporary assignments. Yet LPPs would place this burden on carriers.
74 According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, the current demand for civilian pilots is expected to remain at record levels for the next several
years, and a pilot shortage could occur. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PILOTS: THE LABOR MARKET RELATIONSHIP, REP. No. 86-28
E (1986).
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This is certainly very generous treatment on a comparative basis. Moreover, it would apply to those employees
who are already among the highest paid in American industry. On the basis of equity, this does seem difficult to
justify.
Actually, the LPPs may hurt the favored airline employees in the long run. In the first place, the costs inhibit job
creation and thus are likely to diminish the prospects of a
return to work and/or to their former job by LPP recipients. In addition, LPPs can harm the long run job prospects of downgraded or displaced employees. LPPs are
likely to inhibit such employees from seeking work with
greater long run opportunities that would utilize their talents more constructively. Some workers will take the initiative to look elsewhere rather than accept payment for not
working. Many will not, and thus will fail to grasp opportunities. The result can be long-term unemployment
when the payments for not working cease.
C. Concluding Comment

Under regulation, unions in air transport grew very
strong and pushed wages close to the top of those in
American industry while management acquiesced and
permitted restraints on productivity and overmanning of
jobs as well. The carriers raised fares to cover those costs,
and air travel often cost more than the average consumer
could afford.
Deregulation forced a change. No longer protected
against competition, management was compelled to resist
uneconomic costs, and unions found that nonunion competition restrained their power and ability to insist on ever
larger economic packages and productivity restraints. A
legislatively imposed LPP requirement could obviously
cause the airline industry to regress toward regulation.
Continued restructuring of the industry through competition will grow more difficult if each step costs from $92
million to $388 million. (See Table 21).
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Deregulation was clearly in the public interest. Morrison and Winston conclude that
on all efficiency grounds and on most distributional
grounds, airline deregulation has served the public interest much more effectively than regulation would have.
Substantial progress has been made in achieving the socially optimal level of fares and service for travelers....
The new industry capital structure will lead to more carrier efficiency gains under deregulation. It will also lead to
a reduction in industry costs, owing to more efficient use
of labor."
They also conclude that recent mergers and consolidations "will not cause any harm to travelers' welfare. Actual and potential competition in high-density markets
should remain sufficient to maintain
the level of benefits
' 76
achieved under deregulation.
Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan also support the thesis that
deregulation has been generally beneficial. They found
that regulation was not in the best interests either of carriers or customers; that new schedules and better connecting trips under deregulation are benefitting both carriers
and travelers; that costs have been reduced by improved
equipment and equipment usage, by improving cost controls, and by eliminating "inflexible work rules and higher
than competitive pay;" and that customers have especially
benefitted by lower fares."
Because the benefits of deregulation are so clear, and
because the imposition of LPPs would so obviously be a
re-regulation measure, advocates of LPPs have altered
their rationale. Thus the 1986 House committee report in
support of H.R. 4838, which the House passed but the
Senate defeated, readily admitted that labor strife resulting from airline mergers was unlikely.7 8 Instead, propo7' S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 54, at 72.

16 Id. at 73.
7
E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM, & D. KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 196-97.
78 H.R. REP. No. 822, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986). "In a deregulated system it
is unlikely that labor strife arising out of a merger would disrupt the national air
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nents of H.R. 4838 focused on the need for social welfare
legislation to assist workers displaced as a result of the
substantial merger activity in the airline industry. 79 Proponents have utilized these same arguments in support of
H.R. 1101 and S. 943, but they did not explain how to
justify such liberal social welfare provisions for employees
in an expanding industry who are among the highest paid
in the United States, or why the industry needs regulation
in this respect.
Competition has opened the airline industry to new entrepreneurs and has forced once-tired managements to
react, to rethink, and to redeploy their resources both
more economically and in a manner that better serves the
public interest. The imposition of LPPs could well reduce
employment, adversely affect the balance of payments,
discourage air traffic, and permanently damage an industry now restructuring itself as a result of fair competition.
Neither the public nor the favored airline employees who
are already the most highly compensated employees in
American industry would benefit from the imposition of
LPPs.
transportation system since other carriers are free to provide the services affected
by the strike." Id.
79 See 132 CONG. REC. H6926-30 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1986). A merger places
"the careers and economic futures of airline employees ... at risk without guidelines from the Department of Transportation." Id at H6928 (statement of Rep.

Young).
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APPENDIX A
H.R. 1101
100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H.R. 1101

To amend section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 to ensure fair treatment of airline employees in
mergers and similar transactions.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February, 1987
Mr. MINETA (for himself) and
Mr. Anderson, Mr. Hammerschmidt, Mr. Roe, Mr.
Strangeland, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Gingrich, Mr. Nowak, Mr.
Clinger, Mr. Rahall, Mr. Molinari, Mr. Applegate, Mr.
Sundquist, Mr. de Lugo, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Savage, Mr.
Packard, Mr. Bosco, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Borski, Ms. Bentley, Mr. Kolter, Mr. Towns, Mr. Wise, Mr. Gray (Ill.), Mr.
Visclosky, Mr. Traficant, Mr. Chapman, Ms. Slaughter,
Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Skaggs, and Mr. Perkins.
*A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section
408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958(49 U.S.C. App.
1378) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"FAIR TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES
"(g) In any case which the Secretary determines that the
transaction which is the subject of the application would
tend to cause reduction in employment, or to adversely
affect the wages and working conditions including the
seniority of any air carrier employees, labor protective
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provisions calculated to mitigate such adverse consequences, including procedures culminating in binding arbitration, if necessary, shall be imposed by the Secretary
as a condition of approval, unless the Secretary finds that
the projected costs of protection would exceed the anticipated financial benefits of the transaction. The proponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of proving
there will be no adverse employment consequences or
that projected costs of protection would be excessive."
(b) That portion of the table of contents contained in
the first section of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which
appears under the side heading "Sec. 408. Consolidation,
merger, and acquisition of control." is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(g) Fair treatment of employees.".
Although this Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on June 27, 1987, it was nevertheless added to
H.R. 3051, which in turn was passed by the House on October 5, 1987, and by the Senate on October 30, 1987.
The provision in S.943, which would transfer the authority for imposing LPPs from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Labor, was included in the
Senate version of H.R. 3051. Moreover, the Senate version also included the wording of H.R. 3332, which applies to mergers involving short line railroads.
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
REDUCTION IN FORCE
SCENARIOS OF
HYPOTHETICAL AIRLINE
The basic concept of our analysis was to identify the effects on a hypothetical airline with a reduction in force of
ten, twenty, or thirty percent. This reduction would occur
due to the closing of one of its hubs on January 1st of next
year. The size of each hub was determined by the daily
ASMs generated at each hub and was compared to the total daily ASMs for the airline. For example, the small hub
had ten percent of the airline's total ASMs. The results of
our analysis of each of the three hub scenarios reflects the
individual composition of the hub closed and the specific
interaction that the hub had with the airline system as a
whole.
In order to determine the specific characteristics of
each hub and the hypothetical airline, actual data from an
operating airline was obtained and modified. This data
included the daily ASMs daily departures, monthly block
hours, monthly pilot and flight attendant hours and utilization rates, employee headcount and distribution in the
system, and contract, wage and personel policies.
SEVERANCE
Severance costs were calculated first. Once we knew the
number of employees in each category in the system to be
reduced, we could determine the seniority levels in the
system affected and give a monetary value to each employee reduction. This monetary value included an average wage rate for the seniority level plus the appropriate
fringe or benefit expense. Since the hub is assumed to be
closed in the future, on January 1st with the current employee headcount and seniority levels static, the employees will have at least one year of seniority and be eligible
for the minimum two weeks of severance pay.
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Termination included the additional cost of paying
earned, but unused, vacation. Based on the personnel
policies, terminated employees' earned vacation payment
was calculated for the year prior to the January 1st dosing. This payment included a normal work period rate of
pay, plus the associated fringe benefits based on those
payments.
In order to demonstrate the calculations, we can use a
category of IAM worker, the ramp servicers in the small
hub. There were 527 reductions from this group in the
total airline. Of those, 413 had one year of service, and
114 had two years of service. Workers with one or two
years of service were eligible for two weeks, or eighty
hours, of both severance pay and earned vacation. The
calculations were as follows:
413 employees ($11.15/hr x 80 hrs) = $368,396
114 employees ($16.84/hr x 80 hrs) = $153,581
$521,977
In this example, both severance and earned vacation
were the same eighty hour calculation, so that the total
severance and vacation expense was $1,043,954.
MOVING
The next major calculation was moving costs associated
with the closing of a hub. Moving costs arose because of
two factors. One factor involved moves of employees with
enough seniority at the hub not to be terminated. The
second factor involved moves in the system generated by
employee seniority, insuring the correct number of employees to provide the reduced level of service at each system location. The methods used to calculate those
employees eligible for moves and projected actual moves,
varied for each employee group. The assumptions relating to each method used were included in either the page
of moving assumptions or the pages of hub moving costs.
The assumptions were based on knowledge of how these
employee groups functioned within the airline industry
and socio-economic factors affecting these employee
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groups. There was consistency among groups whose
work was affected by similar factors.
The cost of an employee move ($5,100) included moving household goods, one house hunting trip, on the road
expenses to a new location and temporary living expenses
at the new location. In addition, management moves included a real estate assistance cost of $25,000.
Continuing with our example of ramp servicers, of the
total 527 terminations, 120 were terminations at the small
hub for employees with one or two years of service. This
left 407 to be terminated through the rest of the system
and 87 (207 hub employees - 120 terminations) non-terminations at the hub. To determine the eligible employee
moves for ramp servicers, we took a ratio of the ramp servicer reductions in the system to the ramp servicer reductions in the hub. This ratio was then used to adjust the
non-terminated ramp servicers at the hub. Through this
calculation we were able to more directly relate the effects
of the hub closing to the system. The groups of employees, ramp servicers, agents and mechanics, that were cal,
culated in this manner were most directly associated with
the hub and system interaction.
The calculation for eligible moves for ramp servicers
was as follows:
527 terminations in the system
X 87 nonterminations at hub = 221
207 terminations at the hub
Since we have assumed that for every two eligible ramp
servicer moves, only one would occur, there were only
111 actual moves.
111 @ $5,100/move = $566,100
LPP
LPP costs were the last to be determined. They were
considered in four parts: dismissal allowance, displacement allowance, real estate assistance, and pilot retraining.
The minimum dismissal allowance for a terminated em-
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ployee with one year seniority was six months. Since it
was assumed that termination benefits run concurrently,
the employee received severance for two weeks (for employees with one year of service), thereby leaving approximately 5.5 months of dismissal allowance.
The dismissal allowance was calculated at sixty percent
of the base pay rate, plus the associated fringe costs, with
the exception of medical related benefits. We assumed
that the carrier incurred a fixed cost per employee to provide these benefits, and the benefits were not determined
by payroll costs, as are other fringe benefits.
In our example for ramp servicers in the small hub:
413 employees X $1357/mo (wages at 60%
+ benefits) X 5.5 months
= $3,082,426
114 employees X $1897/mo (wages at 60%
+ benefits) X 5.5 months
= $1,189,419
Total Dismissal Allowance
$4,271,845
The displacement allowance protects, for a period of
time, the original wages of an employee who now has
lower wages, resulting from either a change to a lower
paying position or to a position with fewer hours. The
displacement allowance was actually calculated on the differential between the old wages and the new for a period
of four years.
The number of employee actual moves resulting from
displacement varies by employee group. All IAM moves
were assumed to cause a displacement, based on the actual number of moves and how well the system could absorb the moves. In other words, the greater the number
of moves, the greater effect on the system, the greater the
number of displacements.
In our example of 111 actual employee moves, a rather
small number out of the total servicers in the system, only
ten were assumed to be displaced down one level to airline servicers.
The example had a monthly wage and benefit differential of $299.54. Therefore,
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10 employees X $299.54/mo X 48 months = $143,781
total displacement cost.
Pilot displacement cost was calculated in the same manner, yet the determination of the number of displacements was different in that it was the result of shifts in the
seniority hierarchy and the resulting changes necessary to
get each remaining pilot into the proper slot.
We also calculated displacement for the agents. All
agent displacements were assumed to result from fulltime to part-time changes with the number of working
hours going from 40/week to 20/week. Once the differential was determined, the calculation was the same as for
the IAM workers.
Real estate assistance was comprised of two parts; one
relating to renters and the other to homeowners. The
rental assistance provided financial reimbursement for
those breaking a lease. For twenty-five percent of the employee moves, we assumed these costs to be the
equivalent of two months rent at $400/mo. We have also
assumed that only fifty percent of renters will need this
assistance, since many will walk away from their leases.
We assumed the remaining seventy-five percent of the
actual employee moves involved homeowners. Their real
estate assistance was designed to make up the difference if
they did not receive the fair market value for their dwelling. We have assumed this occurs for fifteen percent of
the homeowners and was equal to only a ten percent loss
of fair market value.
In our continuing example, the 111 actual moves of
ramp servicers would involve twenty-eight renters and
eighty-three homeowners. Of the twenty-eight renters,
fifty percent or fourteen would be out of pocket $800 in
order to break their leases. This is a total of $11,200.
Of the eighty-three homeowners, twelve would not receive the fair market value for their home. In the small
hub, the average home was valued at $66,600. A ten percent loss on that average home was $6,660, making the
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real estate assistance for the twelve moves equal to
$79,920.
Pilot retraining was considered as a part of the total
cost of LPP. In order to get the correct pilot, based on
seniority, into the right aircraft and the right seat, retraining was necessary. Retraining consisted of both pilots
who would need initial training because they had not
flown for over eighteen months, and pilots who would
only need requalification.
Initial training required anywhere from seventeen to
twenty-six working days, or twenty-one to thirty-three calendar days, depending on the type of aircraft. The working days were spent in ground school and on a simulator.
In the case of DC 10's, one day was spent in the aircraft,
with an added cost of $5,600/plane for fuel, maintenance
and landing fees. It was assumed that three pilots would
be qualifiying at the same time. Requalification training
required eight working days and ten calendar days for
ground school and the simulator.
The costs calculated for retraining also included the pilots' pay and fringe benefits for each working day. Based
on the union contract, pilots were paid at 4.5 hours per
day for requalification training and 2.67 hours per day for
initial training. The additional cost of per diem and a hotel was calculated at $64/day for each calendar day of
training. For all DC 10 pilots, the cost of aircraft training
was also included.
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